


Americans





JOHNSON, Sir WILLIAM, superintendent of northern Indians; b. c. 1715, eldest son of Christopher Johnson of Smithtown (near Dunshaughlin, Republic of Ireland) and Anne Warren, sister of Vice-Admiral Sir Peter Warren*; d. 11 July 1774 at Johnson Hall (Johnstown, N.Y.).

In 1736 William Johnson began acting as agent for Peter Warren, receiving rent from Warren's Irish tenants. Early in 1738 Johnson came to America to oversee an estate that Warren had acquired near Fort Hunter, in the Mohawk valley of New York. He arrived at a propitious moment, since the struggle between France and Britain for hegemony in eastern North America came to a climax during his lifetime. To this conflict Johnson gave the remainder of his life, and through it he built his fortune, one of the largest in colonial America.

With much capital supplied by his naval uncle, Johnson became within a decade of his arrival the most substantial businessman on the Mohawk. Employing white indentured labourers and black slaves, he established a 200-acre farm on the south bank of the river; in 1739 he bought an 815-acre tract on the north side with access to the King's Road, which reached as far west as the Oneida Carrying Place (near Oneida Lake). Through an agent he began trading in imported English goods to the Indian settlement of Oquaga (near Binghamton). He also contracted with farmers for their surpluses of wheat and peas. By 1743 he had opened trade to Oswego (Chouaguen), the principal fur-trading post of British America. His shop on the King's Road served as the supply centre for all his dealings, and he thus cut into the long-established monopoly of the Dutch houses in Albany. He also shipped his own goods to New York City, where they were sold or transported either to the West Indies or to London.

Such business skill and success inevitably led to involvement in public affairs. In April 1745 he was made a justice of the peace for Albany County. Between 1745 and 1751 he was colonel of the Six Nations Indians, a responsibility formerly held in commission by several Albany fur-merchants. His influence with the Six Nations, especially his neighbours the Mohawks, soared, for he had ready access to provincial funds to pay the Indians regularly for their services. During the War of the Austrian Succession he attempted to organize Indian scouting and raiding parties on the frontier in support of a planned attack on Fort Saint-Frédéric (near Crown Point, N.Y.), but he was not particularly successful since the Six Nations generally remained committed to neutrality. In February 1748 he was made colonel of the 14 militia companies on the New York frontier, and in May colonel of the militia regiment for the city and county of Albany, positions which he held for the rest of his life and which opened great opportunities for patronage. He was appointed to the New York Council in April 1750, but he rarely attended its sittings.



Johnson Hall

Most of his time during the interval of relative peace from 1748 to 1754 he spent in pursuit of his private fortune. In April 1746 he had won the contract to supply the garrison at Oswego, and by 1751 he had provided goods and services amounting to £7,773, New York currency. Though he claimed a loss of about five per cent on the contract, he clearly profited from it by collecting duties at Oswego and by padding his accounts. With the approach of the Seven Years' War he once again became deeply involved in provincial affairs. A member of the New York delegation to the Albany Congress in June and July 1754, he advocated increased expenditure for garrisons among the Indians at strategic points and called for a regular policy of paying Indians for their services. He wanted young men to be sent among the native people as interpreters, schoolmasters, and catechists. The congress came to no agreement, but a month later the Board of Trade

decided on its own initiative to create a regular Indian administration financed by parliament. In April 1755 Edward Braddock, commander-in-chief in North America, selected Johnson to manage relations with the Six Nations and their dependent tribes. As he explained to the Duke of Newcastle, Johnson was "a person particularly qualify'd for it by his great influence with those Indians." In February 1756 Johnson received a royal commission as "Colonel of . . . the Six united Nations of Indians, & their Confederates, in the Northern Parts of North America" and "Sole Agent and Superintendant of the said Indians."



Battle of lake George

In April 1755 Braddock had also made Johnson commander, with the provincial commission of major-general, of an expedition to take Fort Saint-Frédéric. The campaign, which called as well for a force under Braddock to seize Fort Duquesne (Pittsburgh, Pa) and one under William Shirley to take Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.), was a dismal failure except for one engagement in which Johnson was involved early in September. At Lake George (Lac Saint-Sacrement) with part of his force of some 300 Indians headed by Theyanoguin* and 3,000 Americans, Johnson learned that a strong French column under Jean-Armand Dieskau* was moving towards Fort Edward, where the rest of his men were encamped. Johnson's relief detachment was ambushed and the survivors hotly pursued by some French regulars, who rashly attempted to take the hastily fortified position at Lake George by storm. They were cut to pieces by the Americans, and Dieskau was wounded and captured. Johnson, himself wounded early in the attack, played little part in the battle but was given credit for its outcome. When he visited New York City at the end of the year, he was greeted as a hero, and the king created him a baronet. In 1757 parliament made him a gift of £5,000. Never was such an insignificant encounter so generously rewarded.


Johnson had resigned his military commission late in 1755, and thereafter his duties largely concerned Indian affairs. With Indian raids disturbing the Pennsylvania frontier, he was given permission to appoint a deputy there, George Croghan. Their attempts to enlist Indians in the British cause were unrewarding during the early years of the war, which were marked by singular British setbacks. Fort Bull (east of Oneida Lake) was overrun by forces under Gaspard-Joseph Chaussegros de Léry in March 1756. Oswego fell to Montcalm* that August and was destroyed. Fort William Henry (also known as Fort George, now Lake George) surrendered in August 1757, and German Flats (near the mouth of West Canada Creek) was attacked in November. In 1758 a huge force under James Abercromby failed to take Fort Carillon (Ticonderoga). The Indians largely remained neutral, and Johnson's prestige, despite his numerous conferences with them, waned.



This situation was altered by the string of victories beginning with Amherst's capture of Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island), in 1758 and culminating in the fall of Fort Niagara and Quebec. The successful attack on Niagara was an important military encounter for Johnson. Undetected by Pierre Pouchot*'s garrison, the British under John Prideaux concentrated at Niagara a force of about 3,300 regular and provincial troops early in July 1759. Johnson, as second in command, was responsible for the contingent of some 940 Indians. After less than two weeks of siege Prideaux was killed and Johnson assumed command. Five days later a French force under François-Marie Le Marchand* de Lignery, coming from the Ohio valley, approached to relieve the garrison. Johnson sprang an ambush so successfully that the enemy not slain or taken prisoner fled in panic. The

next day, 25 July, the fort surrendered. With it went control of the strategically important portage; the main artery of the French fur trade had been cut.

In the final campaign of the war Johnson accompanied Amherst to Montreal in 1760. Although he started out with almost 700 Indians, Johnson led only 185 into the city, the rest having departed following the surrender of Fort Lévis (east of Prescott, Ont.). After a few days in Montreal, he appointed Christian Daniel Claus his resident deputy there and returned to the Mohawk valley.



Indian council

Indian affairs acquired a new dimension and a new importance with the fall of Canada. Problems that had necessarily been dealt with piecemeal during the war now demanded broader approaches. Johnson's policy, never spelled out in much detail despite various promptings from London, had four main points. The purchase of Indian lands should be controlled at a pace determined by the tribes' willingness to sell. Trade should be restricted to designated posts and be carried on at fixed prices by traders required to post bond and licensed annually. To oversee the administration the superintendent would have need not only of deputies but also of commissary-inspectors, interpreters, and gunsmiths. To finance its operation he suggested a tariff on rum.

What happened was rather different. Though much of the administration was established it was paid for by parliament. Prices were never fixed, and traders were never wholly restricted by bonds, licences, or designated trading posts. Moreover, the governors of Canada, through which most of the fur trade passed, issued their own licences and took measures to control the trade without reference to Johnson or his deputy there. Worse still for Johnson was the fact that since his regulations never

had legal force he was powerless to punish those who ignored his sanctions. From 1768, when London abandoned its centralized control of Indian affairs, each colony was left to develop as best it could its relations with the Indians on its frontier. This decision coincided with another the home authorities made for economy, to withdraw garrisons from the western posts. Thereafter Johnson ought to have had close dealings with the New York government, yet he was never consulted about Indian affairs. Nor did he bother to build a party of support in the council or the assembly.



As superintendent he was under the orders of the commander-in-chief in North America, until 1763 Amherst, with whom Johnson greatly differed in opinion. Since the real instrument of British power in America was the army, Amherst's views carried the day. Whereas Johnson wished to encourage the supply of arms and ammunition to the Indians, Amherst, who put little value on their services, wished to restrict it. Whereas Johnson always worked diplomatically for an accommodation with the Indians, Amherst wished to deal forcefully with any tribe that opposed British arms. The 1763–64 Indian uprising would doubtless have resulted in a serious clash between Johnson and the commander-in-chief had not Amherst, at the height of the crisis, been given leave to return home to England. His successor, Gage, reverted to the policy Lord Loudoun and Abercromby had followed; he issued no direct orders and left the superintendent free to work out details. In this way peace was made with Pontiac* and his allies, and little retribution was taken for the deaths of nearly 400 soldiers and perhaps 2,000 settlers.

After 1760 Johnson conferred frequently with the Indians, settling grievances and renewing covenants of friendship with them on behalf of the crown. In 1766 he met with Pontiac at Oswego, and in 1768 at Fort Stanwix (Rome, N.Y.) he settled the new boundary line for Indian lands with Kaieñ'kwaahstoñ and other leaders. Thereafter he confined himself largely to meeting the Six Nations at his home. It was in the midst of one such conference in July 1774 that he fell ill "with a fainting and suffocation which . . . carried him off in two hours." Gage remarked: "The king has lost a faithful, intelligent servant, of consummate knowledge in Indian affairs, who could be very ill spared at this juncture, and his friends an upright,

worthy and respectable man, who merited their esteem." This verdict has generally been endorsed by historians and biographers.

In fact Johnson served himself at least as well as he served his king. From April 1755 until his death some £146,546 came into his hands as superintendent, an annual average of £7,700. From it he received his salary, as well as salaries for his son John* and sons-in-law Guy Johnson and Daniel Claus. He arranged for the crown to rent his store and pay his storekeeper's wages and he charged the crown two and one-half per cent commission on all goods he supplied to the Indians as superintendent. He had the crown build a school for the Indians and pay a schoolmaster's salary, though he took credit for both. Perhaps the principal item in value furnished to the Indians was rum. The same accounts charged the crown with the cost of burying Indians killed while drunk. He never submitted vouchers, only the bald accounts, which, though unaudited, were always paid.

There was also considerable conflict of interest in Johnson's dealings in Indian lands. Publicly he represented a policy to prevent the despoliation of such lands, yet privately he arranged for their purchase by himself and by others. These tracts were without value to whites unless settled and cultivated, and by that process the Indian way of life, in which hunting played an important part, was destroyed. As superintendent, Johnson negotiated the land deal between the prospective purchaser and the Indians, and at least from 1771 he had the permission of the Six Nations to set the price of their land.

The territory he acquired for himself was not insignificant. He accepted a 130,000-acre grant from the Mohawks of Canajoharie (near Little Falls, N.Y.). For £300, New York currency, he bought about 100,000 acres on the Charlotte Creek, a tributary of the Susquehanna River though as a result of boundary limits set by the Fort Stanwix agreement of 1768 he was obliged to abandon his purchase. In 1765, less than three months after a treaty had been concluded with Pontiac, designed in part to allay Indian fears for their land, Johnson purchased some 40,000 acres from the Oneidas. In all this he acted no differently from dozens of other speculators in Indian lands. He was distinguished only by the great advantages he possessed through his office and through his long intimacy with the Indians. He was indeed one of their principal exploiters; his actions speak louder than any words of his. He was a typical imperial servant, in an area where he had few competitors able to match his intelligence and interest – an almost unbeatable combination in the 18th century.

Johnson was a man of some intellectual curiosity, and he amassed a substantial library of books and periodicals. On occasion he purchased scientific instruments. In January 1769 he was elected a member of the American Philosophical Society, but he never went to its meetings. He also belonged to the Society for the Promotion of Arts and Agriculture and to the board of trustees of Queen's College (Rutgers University, New Brunswick, N.J.), though he never attended its sessions.

There is no evidence that Johnson ever married. In his will he acknowledged as his wife Catherine Weissenberg (Wisenberg), an indentured servant who had escaped from her New York City owner. He took her in in 1739, and by the time of her death in April 1759 they had had three children. He is thought to have cohabited with many Indian women, but his most important liaison, for personal and political reasons, was with Mary Brant [KoñwatsiĀtsiaiēñni. Eight of their children survived him.

Julian Gwyn

The earliest portrait of Johnson, completed about 1751, is attributed to John Wollaston and is in the Albany Institute of History and Art (Albany, N.Y.). There is a miniature in the PAC. The N.Y. Hist. Soc. holds an 1837 copy by Edward L. Mooney of a portrait done in 1763 by Thomas McIlworth. A fourth was painted in 1772 or 1773 by Matthew Pratt and hangs in Johnson Hall, the site also of a celebrated bronze statue.

[Johnson has appeared in much fiction, and in the opinion of the noted Johnson scholar Milton W. Hamilton, it was the novels of Robert William Chambers that "gave many Americans their only conception of Sir William." Johnson has been the *subject of* several biographies, none adequate. Errors in the earliest, W. L. [and W. L.] Stone, *The life and times of Sir William Johnson, bart.* (2v., Albany, N.Y., 1865), have often been repeated. The most recent, M. W. Hamilton, *Sir William Johnson, colonial American, 1715–1763* (Port Washington, N.Y., and London, 1976), adds useful detail but misunderstands the central feature of Johnson's career, his relations with the Indians.

Johnson's role as an Indian agent has figured prominently in numerous monographs, the best of which are unpublished. Dissertations include D. A. Armour, "The merchants of Albany, New York, 1686–1760" (phd thesis, Northwestern University, Evanston, Ill., 1965), especially chap.ix; C. R. Canedy, "An entrepreneurial history of the New York frontier, 1739–1776" (phd thesis, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio, 1967), especially chaps.ii–iii; E. P. Dugan, "Sir William Johnson's land policy (1739–1770)" (ma thesis, Colgate University, Hamilton, N.Y., 1953); W. S. Dunn, "Western commerce, 1760–1774" (phd thesis, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1971), especially chap.v; E. R. Fingerhut, "Assimilation of immigrants on the frontier of New York, 1764–1776" (phd thesis, Columbia University, New York, 1962); E. M. Fox, "William Johnson's early career as a frontier landlord and trader" (ma thesis, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., 1945); F. T. Inouye, "Sir William Johnson and the administration of the Northern Indian Department" (phd thesis, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, 1951); D. S. McKeith, "The inadequacy of men and measures in English imperial history: Sir William Johnson and the New York politicians, a case study" (phd thesis, Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y., 1971); Peter Marshall, "Imperial regulation of American Indian affairs, 1763–1774" (phd thesis, Yale University, New Haven, Conn., 1959).

Most of Johnson's manuscripts have been published in *Johnson papers* (Sullivan *et al.*), the last editor of which was M. W. Hamilton, who has also

written a number of short articles on aspects of Johnson's life and on Johnsoniana. Other collections with many Johnson letters are *The documentary history of the state of New-York . . .*, ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (4v., Albany, N.Y., 1849–51) and *NYCD* (O'Callaghan and Fernow), especially vols. VI–VIII. Still unpublished are a number of his accounts in the Clements Library, Thomas Gage papers, and in PRO, AO 1 and T 64.

Two further works dealing with aspects of Johnson's life are F. J. Klingberg, "Sir William Johnson and the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (1749–1774)," which appears in his *Anglican humanitarianism in colonial New York* (Philadelphia, 1940), 87–120, and Julian Gwyn, *The enterprising admiral: the personal fortune of Admiral Sir Peter Warren* (Montreal, 1974), which treats Johnson's relations with his uncle. j.g.]



ROGERS, ROBERT (early in his career he may have signed **Rodgers**), army officer and author; b. 8 Nov. 1731 (n.s.) at Methuen, Massachusetts, son of James and Mary Rogers; m. 30 June 1761 Elizabeth Browne at Portsmouth, New Hampshire; d. 18 May 1795 in London, England.

While Robert Rogers was quite young his family moved to the Great Meadow district of New Hampshire, near present Concord, and he grew up on a frontier of settlement where there was constant contact with Indians and which was exposed to raids in time of war. He got his education in village schools; somewhere he learned to write English which was direct and effective, if ill spelled. When still a boy he saw service, but no action, in the New Hampshire militia during the War of the Austrian Succession. He says in his *Journals* that from 1743 to 1755 his pursuits (which he does not specify) made him acquainted with both the British and the French colonies. It is interesting that he could speak French. In 1754 he became involved with a gang of counteifeiters; he was indicted but the case never came to trial.

In 1755 his military career proper began. He recruited men for the New England force being raised to serve under John Winslow, but when a New Hampshire regiment was authorized he took them into it, and was appointed captain and given command of a company. The regiment was sent to the upper Hudson and came under Major-General William Johnson. Rogers was recommended to Johnson as a good man for scouting duty, and he carried out a series of reconnaissances with small parties against the French in the area of forts Saint-Frédéric (near Crown Point, N.Y.) and Carillon (Ticonderoga). When his regiment was disbanded in the autumn he remained on duty, and through the bitter winter of 1755–56 he continued to lead scouting operations. In March 1756 William Shirley, acting commander-in-chief, instructed him to raise a company of rangers for scouting and intelligence duties in the Lake Champlain region. Rogers did

not invent this type of unit (a ranger company under John Gorham* was serving in Nova Scotia as early as 1744) but he became particularly identified with the rangers of the army. Three other ranger companies were formed in 1756, one of them commanded by Rogers' brother Richard (who died the following year).



Robert Rogers won an increasing reputation for daring leadership, though it can be argued that his expeditions sometimes produced misleading information. In January 1757 he set out through the snow to reconnoitre the French forts on Lake Champlain with some 80 men. There was fierce fighting in which both sides lost heavily, Rogers himself being wounded. He was now given authority over all the ranger companies, and in this year he wrote for the army what may be called a manual of forest fighting, which is to be found in his published Journals. In March 1758 another expedition towards Fort Saint-Frédéric, ordered by Colonel William Haviland against Rogers' advice, resulted in a serious reverse to the rangers. Rogers' reputation with the British command remained high, however, and as of 6 April 1758 Major-General James Abercromby, now commander-in-chief, gave him a formal commission both as captain of a ranger company and as "Major of the Rangers in his Majesty's Service."

That summer Rogers with four ranger companies and two companies of Indians took part in the campaign on Lac Saint-Sacrement (Lake George) and Lake Champlain which ended with Abercromby's disastrous defeat before Fort Carillon. A month later, on 8 August, Rogers with a mixed force some 700 strong fought a fierce little battle near Fort Ann, New York, with a smaller party of Frenchmen and Indians under Joseph Marin de La Malgue and forced it to withdraw.



British doubts of the rangers' efficiency, and their frequent indiscipline, led in this year to the formation of the 80th Foot (Gage's Light Infantry), a regular unit intended for bush-fighting. The rangers were nevertheless still considered essential at least for the moment, and Major-General Jeffery Amherst, who became commander-in-chief late in 1758, was as convinced as his predecessors of Rogers' excellence as a leader of irregulars. Six ranger companies went to Quebec with James Wolfe* in 1759, and six more under Rogers himself formed part of Amherst's own army advancing by the Lake Champlain route. In September Amherst ordered Rogers to undertake an expedition deep into Canada, to destroy the Abenaki village of Saint-François-de-Sales (Odanak). Even though the inhabitants had been warned of his approach, Rogers surprised and burned the village; he claims to have killed "at least two hundred" Indians, but French accounts make the number much smaller. His force retreated by the Connecticut River, closely pursued and suffering from hunger. Rogers himself with great energy and resolution rafted his way down to the first British settlement to send provisions back to his starving followers. The expedition cost the lives of about 50 of his officers and men. In 1760 Rogers with 600 rangers formed the advance guard of Haviland's force invading Canada by the Lake Champlain line, and he was present at the capitulation of Montreal.

Immediately after the French surrender, Amherst ordered Rogers to move with two companies of rangers to take over the French posts in the west. He left Montreal on 13 September with his force in whaleboats. Travelling by way of the ruined posts at the sites of Kingston and Toronto (the latter "a proper place for a factory" he reported to Amherst), and visiting Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh, Pa) to obtain the instructions of Brigadier Robert Monckton, who was in command in the west, he reached Detroit, the only fort with a large French garrison, at the end of November. After taking

it over from François-Marie Picoté de Belestre he attempted to reach Michilimackinac (Mackinaw City, Mich.) and Fort Saint-Joseph (Niles), where there were small French parties, but was prevented by ice on Lake Huron. He states in his later *A concise account of North America* (but not in his report written at the time) that during the march west he met Pontiac*, who received him in a friendly manner and "attended" him to Detroit.



With the end of hostilities in North America the ranger companies were disbanded. Rogers was appointed captain of one of the independent companies of regulars that had long been stationed in South Carolina. Subsequently he exchanged this appointment for a similar one in an independent company at New York; but the New York companies were disbanded in 1763 and Rogers went on half pay. When Pontiac's uprising broke out he joined the force under Captain James Dalyell (Dalzell), Amherst's aide-de-camp, which was sent to reinforce the beleaguered garrison of Detroit [see Henry Gladwin]. Rogers fought his last Indian fight, with courage and skill worthy of his reputation, in the sortie from Detroit on 31 July 1763.

By 1764 Rogers was in serious financial trouble. He had encountered at least temporary difficulty in obtaining reimbursement for the funds he had spent on his rangers, and the collapse of a trading venture with John Askin* at the time of Pontiac's uprising worsened his situation. According to Thomas Gage he also lost money gambling. In 1764 he was arrested for debt in New York but soon escaped.

Rogers went to England in 1765 in hope of obtaining support for plans of western exploration and expansion. He petitioned for authority to mount a search for an inland northwest passage, an idea which may possibly have been implanted in his mind by Governor Arthur Dobbs of North Carolina. To enable him to pursue this project he asked for the appointment of commandant at Michilimackinac, and in October 1765 instructions were sent to Gage, now commanding in America, that he was to be given this post. He was also to be given a captain's commission in the Royal Americans; this it appears he never got.

While in London Rogers published at least two books. One was his *Journals*, an account of his campaigns which reproduces a good many of his reports and the orders he received, and is a valuable contribution to the history of the Seven Years' War in America. The other, *A concise account Of North America*, is a sort of historical geography of the continent, brief and lively and profiting by Rogers' remarkably wide firsthand knowledge. Both are lucid and forceful, rather extraordinary productions from an author with his education. He doubtless got much editorial help from his secretary, Nathaniel Potter, a graduate of the College of New Jersey (Princeton University) whom he had met shortly before leaving America for England; but Sir William Johnson's description of Rogers in 1767 as "a very illiterate man" was probably malicious exaggeration at best. Both books were very well received by the London critics. A less friendly reception awaited *Ponteach; or, the savages of America: a tragedy*, a play in blank verse published a few months later. It was anonymous but seems to have been generally attributed to Rogers. John R. Cuneo has plausibly suggested that the opening scenes, depicting white traders and hunters preying on Indians, may well reflect the influence of Rogers, but that it is hard to connect him with the highflown artificial tragedy that follows. Doubtless, in Francis Parkman's phrase, he "had a share" in composing the play. The *Monthly Review: or, Literary Journal* rudely called *Ponteach* "one of the most absurd productions of the kind that we have seen," and said of the "reputed author", "in turning bard, and writing a tragedy, he makes just as good a figure as would a Grubstreet rhymester at the head of our Author's corps of North-American Rangers." No attempt seems to have been made to produce the play on the stage.

His mission to London having had, on the whole, remarkable success, Rogers returned to North America at the beginning of 1766. He and his wife arrived at Michilimackinac in August, and he lost no time in sending off two exploring parties under Jonathan Carver and James Tute, the latter being specifically instructed to search for the northwest passage. Nothing important came of these efforts.


Both Johnson, who was now superintendent of northern Indians, and Gage evidently disliked and distrusted Rogers; Gage no doubt resented his having gone to the authorities in London over his head. On hearing of Rogers' appointment Gage wrote to Johnson: "He is wild, vain, of little understanding, and of as little Principle; but withal has a share of Cunning, no Modesty or veracity and sticks at Nothing . . . He deserved Some Notice for his Bravery and readiness on Service and if they had put him on whole Pay. to give him an Income to live upon, they would have done well. But, this employment he is most unfit for, and withal speaks no Indian Language. He made a great deal of money during the War, which was squandered in Vanity and Gaming. and is some Thousands in Debt here [in New York]." Almost immediately Gage received an intercepted letter which could be read as indicating that Rogers might be intriguing with the French. Rogers was certainly ambitious and clearly desired to carve out for himself some sort of semi-independent fiefdom in the west. In 1767 he drafted a plan under which Michilimackinac and its dependencies should be erected into a "Civil Government," with a governor, lieutenant governor, and a council of 12 members chosen from the principal merchants trading in the

region. The governor and council would report in all civil and Indian matters direct to the king and the Privy Council in England. This plan was sent to London and Rogers petitioned the Board of Trade for appointment as governor. Such a project was bound to excite still further the hostility of Gage and Johnson, and it got nowhere. Rogers quarrelled with his secretary Potter and the latter reported that his former chief was considering going over to the French if his plan for a separate government was not approved. On the strength of an affidavit by Potter to this effect Gage ordered Rogers arrested and charged with high treason. This was done in December 1767 and in the spring Rogers was taken east in irons. In October 1768 he was tried by court martial at Montreal on charges of "designs . . . of Deserting to the French . . . and stirring up the Indians against His Majesty and His Government"; "holding a correspondence with His Majesty's Enemies"; and disobedience of orders by spending money on "expensive schemes and projects" and among the Indians. Although these charges were supported by Benjamin Roberts, the former Indian department commissary at Michilimackinac, Rogers was acquitted. It seems likely that he had been guilty of no crime more serious than loose talk. The verdict was approved by the king the following year, though with the note that there had been "great reason to suspect . . . an improper and dangerous Correspondence." Rogers was not reinstated at Michilimackinac. In the summer of 1769 he went to England seeking redress and payment of various sums which he claimed as due him. He received little satisfaction and spent several periods in debtors' prison, the longest being in 1772-74. He sued Gage for false imprisonment and other injuries; the suit was later withdrawn and Rogers was granted a major's half pay. He returned to America in 1775.

The American Revolutionary War was now raging. Rogers, no politician, might have fought on either side, but for him neutrality was unlikely. His British commission made him an object of suspicion to the rebels. He was arrested in Philadelphia but released on giving his parole not to serve against the colonies. In 1776 he sought a Continental commission, but General George Washington distrusted and imprisoned him. He escaped and offered his services to the British headquarters at New York. In August he was appointed to raise and command with the rank of lieutenant-colonel commandant a battalion which seems to have been known at this stage as the Queen's American Rangers. On 21 October this raw unit was attacked by the Americans near Mamaroneck, New York. A ranger outpost was overrun but Rogers' main force stood firm and the attackers withdrew. Early in 1777 an inspector general appointed to report on the loyalist units found Rogers' in poor condition, and he was retired on half pay. The Queen's Rangers, as they came to be known, later achieved distinction under regular commanders, notably John Graves Simcoe*.

Rogers' military career was not quite over. Returning in 1779 from a visit to England, he was commissioned by General Sir Henry Clinton – who may have been encouraged from London – to raise a unit of two battalions, to be recruited in the American colonies but organized in Canada, and known as the King's Rangers. The regiment was never completed and never fought. The burden of recruiting it fell largely on Rogers' brother James, also a ranger officer of the Seven Years' War. Robert by now was drunken and inefficient, and not above lying about the number of men raised.

Governor Frederick Haldimand wrote of him, "he at once disgraces the Service, & renders himself incapable of being Depended upon." He was in Quebec in 1779–80. At the end of 1780, while on his way to New York by sea, he was captured by an American privateer and spent a long period in prison. By 1782 he was back behind the British lines. At the end of the war he went to England, perhaps leaving New York with the British force at the final evacuation in 1783.



Rogers' last years were spent in England in debt, poverty, and drunkenness. Part of the time he was again in debtors' prison. He lived on his half pay, which was often partly assigned to creditors. He died in London "at his apartments in the Borough [Southwark]," evidently intestate; letters of administration of his estate, estimated at only £100, were granted to John Walker, said to be his landlord. His wife had divorced him by act of the New Hampshire legislature in 1778, asserting that when she last saw him a couple of years before "he was in a situation which, as her peace and safety forced her *then* to shun & fly from him so Decency *now* forbids her to say more upon so indelicate a subject." Their only child, a son named Arthur, stayed with his mother.

The extraordinary career that thus ended in sordid obscurity had reached its climax in the Seven Years' War, before Rogers was 30. American legend has somewhat exaggerated his exploits; for he often met reverses as well as successes in his combats with the French and their Indian allies in the Lake Champlain country. But he was a man of great energy and courage (and, it must be said, of considerable ruthlessness), who had something of a genius for irregular war. No other American frontiersman succeeded so well in coping with the formidable bush-fighters of New France. That the frontiersman was also the author of successful books suggests a highly unusual combination of qualities. His personality remains enigmatic. Much

of the evidence against him comes from those who disliked him; but it is pretty clear that his moral character was far from being on the same level as his abilities. Had it been so, he would have been one of the most remarkable Americans of a remarkable generation.

C. P. Stacey

[Robert Rogers' published works have all been reissued: *Journals of Major Robert Rogers* . . . (London, 1765) in an edition by F. B. Hough (Albany, N.Y., 1883) with an appendix of documents concerning Rogers' later career, in a reprint with an introduction by H. H. Peckham (New York, [1961]), and in a facsimile reprint (Ann Arbor, Mich., [1966]); *A concise account of North America* . . . (London, 1765) in a reprint (East Ardsley, Eng., and New York, 1966); and the play attributed to Rogers, *Ponteach; or, the savages of America: a tragedy* (London, 1766), with an introduction and biography of Rogers by Allan Nevins (Chicago, 1914) and in *Representative plays by American dramatists*, ed. M. J. Moses (3v., New York, 1918-[25]), I, 115–208. Part of the play is printed in Francis Parkman, *The conspiracy of Pontiac and the Indian war after the conquest of Canada* (2v., Boston, 1910), app.B.

Unpublished mss or transcripts of mss concerning Rogers are located in Clements Library, Thomas Gage papers, American series; Rogers papers; in PAC, MG 18, L4, 2, pkt.7; MG 23, K3; and in PRO, Prob. 6/171, f.160; TS 11/387, 11/1069/4957.

Printed material by or relating to Rogers can be found in *The documentary history of the state of New-York* . . . , ed. E. B. O'Callaghan (4v., Albany, 1849–51), IV; *Gentleman's Magazine*, 1765, 584–85; *Johnson papers* (Sullivan et al.); "Journal of Robert Rogers the ranger on his expedition for receiving the capitulation of western French posts," ed. V. H. Paltsits, New York Public Library, *Bull.*, 37 (1933), 261–76; *London Magazine, or Gentleman's Monthly Intelligencer*, XXXIV (1765), 630–32, 676–78; XXXV (1766), 22–24; *Military affairs in North America, 1748–65* (Pargellis); *Monthly Review: or, Literary Journal* (London), XXXIV (1766), pt.1, 9–22, 79–80, 242; NYCD (O'Callaghan and Fernow), VII, VIII, X; "Rogers's Michillimackinac journal," ed. W. L. Clements, American Antiquarian Soc., *Proc.* (Worcester, Mass.), new ser., 28 (1918), 224–73; *Times* (London), 22 May 1795; *Treason? at Michilimackinac: the proceedings of a general court martial held at Montreal in October 1768 for the trial of Major Robert Rogers*, ed. D. A. Armour (Mackinac Island, Mich., 1967).

The considerable Rogers cult that has been in evidence in the United States during the last generation probably owes a good deal to K. L. Roberts' popular historical novel, *Northwest passage* (Garden City, N.Y., 1937; new ed., 2v., 1937). Entries for Rogers are to be found in the *DAB* and *DNB*. J. R. Cuneo, *Robert Rogers of the rangers* (New York, 1959) is an excellent biography based on a wide range of sources but marred by lack of specific documentation. See also: Luca Codignola, *Guerra a guerriglia nell'America coloniale: Robert Rogers a la guerra dei sette anni, 1754–1760* (Venice, 1977), which contains a translation into Italian of

Rogers' *Journals*; H. M. Jackson, *Rogers' rangers, a history* ([Ottawa], 1953); S. McC. Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun*, and "The four independent companies of New York," *Essays in colonial history presented to Charles McLean Andrews by his students* (New Haven, Conn., and London, 1931; repr. Freeport, N.Y., 1966), 96–123; Francis Parkman, *Montcalm and Wolfe* (2v., Boston, 1884; repr. New York, 1962); J. R. Cuneo, "The early days of the Queen's Rangers, August 1776–February 1777," *Military Affairs* (Washington), XXII (1958), 65–74; Walter Rogers, "Rogers, ranger and loyalist," *RSC Trans.*, 2nd ser., VI (1900), sect.ii, 49–59. c.p.s.]



BRADSTREET, JOHN (baptized **Jean-Baptiste**), army officer and office-holder; b. 21 Dec. 1714 at Annapolis Royal, Nova Scotia, second son of Edward Bradstreet and Agathe de Saint-Étienne* de La Tour; m. Mary Aldridge, and they had two daughters; d. 25 Sept. 1774 in New York City.

John Bradstreet and his brother Simon served in Nova Scotia as volunteers in Richard Philipps*' regiment (40th Foot) until 1735, when their mother, working through the regimental agent King Gould, secured commissions for them. John received an ensign's rank and thus began a military career which would be capped when he became a major-general in 1772.

Confusion surrounds the early years and family of John Bradstreet as the result of the presence in Nova Scotia of a cousin of the same name. After the latter's death John compounded the confusion by marrying his widow, and two of the four children believed to be his were actually his cousin's. In later years Bradstreet was reticent to discuss his family background and the Nova Scotian phase of his career. No doubt uneasiness about the effect his Acadian ancestry would have on his career in the British army, as well as his involvement in questionable trading activities, explain his silence. The result has been a historical picture of Bradstreet as an enigmatic figure who first emerged during the campaign against Louisbourg, Île Royale (Cape Breton Island) in 1745. As a young officer stationed at Canso in the 1730s, however, Bradstreet had been very active. In addition to carrying out his military duties, he had developed a lucrative trade in provisions and lumber with the French fortress. Despite advice from Gould to "Knock off" such activities lest they damage his military career, Bradstreet continued his mercantile connections with Louisbourg well into 1743. Not surprisingly, when Canso and its garrison were captured by the French in May 1744 [see François Du Pont Duvivier], Bradstreet was given preferred treatment. During the next few months he became the message

bearer between the commandant of Louisbourg, Jean-Baptiste-Louis Le Prévost*, Duquesnel, and Governor William Shirley of Massachusetts as prisoner exchanges were discussed. Bradstreet also worked at turning his knowledge of Louisbourg to good advantage in New England and improving his chances of promotion in Britain. The very day in September 1744 that the released Canso garrison reached Boston, Bradstreet and George Ryall, a fellow officer in the garrison, submitted a report on Louisbourg to Shirley which stressed the fortress's importance to the French empire and hinted at its vulnerability. Three months later, Bradstreet presented Shirley with a plan for an assault on the French stronghold. Whether it was used as the basis for the 1745 attack is uncertain since no copy is now available. William Vaughan* claimed to have been the author of the definitive plan; however, Bradstreet was described by William Pepperrell* as "the first projector of the expedition," and Shirley claimed that it was because of Bradstreet's "Intelligence and advice . . . that I set the Expedition on foot."



Fort frontenac

Although disappointed that he was not given command of the expedition, Bradstreet accepted a provincial commission as lieutenant-colonel of the 1st Massachusetts Regiment and contributed to the victory at Louisbourg. Pepperrell, Commodore Peter Warren*, and Shirley all applauded his performance. The day after the surrender Bradstreet was commissioned "Town Major of ye City and Fortress," but the more substantial rewards he clearly expected were not forthcoming. Moreover, after Charles Knowles became governor of Cape Breton in June 1746, even his position as town major was lost. Personal animosity developed between the two men, and rewarding sidelines for Bradstreet, such as providing rum and fuel to the garrison, were curtailed by Knowles, who claimed that he no longer permitted Bradstreet "to Plunder the Government." Although Bradstreet had been appointed captain in Pepperrell's newly established

regular regiment garrisoning the fortress and on 16 Sept. 1746 was appointed lieutenant governor of St John's, Newfoundland, he remained bitter. Further attempts to improve his situation failing and continued frustration at Louisbourg being unacceptable, he journeyed to St John's in August 1747 to begin active service as lieutenant governor.



Newfoundland turned out to be only a temporary resting place, however, since in the fall of 1751 he went to England. Armed with his journal of the siege, reciting his contributions, and bemoaning his treatment, he soon regained the support of King Gould and Gould's son Charles which he had lost because of his trading activities, and he aroused the interest of powerful persons such as Sir Richard Lyttleton, an intimate of William Pitt, Charles Townshend, later chancellor of the exchequer under Pitt, and Lord Baltimore. Although both Townshend and Baltimore were ultimately unsuccessful in their attempts to obtain preferment for him, Lyttleton and Charles Gould were to prove more useful. Having gained badly needed "Easie Access" to patrons in England, Bradstreet returned to America in 1755 with Major-General Edward Braddock's expedition.

Now a captain in Pepperrell's newly raised 51st Foot, he was initially assigned to Shirley's campaign against Fort Niagara (near Youngstown, N.Y.) the same year. Lacking experienced personnel, the Massachusetts governor relied heavily on his old Louisbourg adviser. In the spring of 1755 he ordered Bradstreet to Oswego (Chouaguen) to improve its defences and prepare it as a base for the assault on Niagara. Bradstreet carried out his orders energetically and in August he was promoted brevet-major and adjutant-general. During the summer, however, Shirley had encountered difficulty in organizing and transporting his army to Oswego, and as the opportunity for a Niagara strike slipped away Bradstreet sought permission for an immediate attack on the French fort. Shirley had rejected this plan, and in September he abandoned the campaign altogether. He decided that an attack on Fort Frontenac (Kingston, Ont.), which he described as "the Key" to Lake Ontario, must be the first campaign of 1756, and he assigned the task to Bradstreet.

One of Bradstreet's first duties in the spring was to lead a convoy of bateaux to reinforce the garrison at Oswego. Once there he was to select

the necessary men and supplies and attack Fort Frontenac. He had difficulty in reaching Oswego, however, and its weakened garrison and incomplete fortifications made it obvious that an offensive against Frontenac was impossible. Since French pressure on Oswego was now growing, Bradstreet directed his efforts to keeping the supply line between Oswego and Albany open. He returned to Oswego once more on 1 July 1756 and then waited impatiently in Albany to set out again. In mid August, however, Montcalm* captured Oswego.



The Mohawk River

By then Lord Loudoun had replaced Shirley as commander of the British forces in America. Shirley's enemies, such as Sir Charles Hardy and Sir William Johnson, identified Bradstreet as one of his cohorts, but Bradstreet was quick to dissociate himself from his former commander. Forewarned in March 1756 by Charles Gould that Shirley "is no longer in great esteem here," Bradstreet became somewhat uncooperative when Shirley attempted to collect information for his own vindication. He moved instead to endear himself to Loudoun and his staff, and his strategy worked perfectly. Of all the measures that Shirley had authorized, only Bradstreet's performance "won the unqualified praise of Shirley's successors." With Loudoun's approval the bills for his bateau service were honoured, he received a captaincy in the Royal Americans (60th Foot) when the 51st was disbanded early in 1757, and he became virtual quartermaster and aide-de-camp to Loudoun. During the spring of 1757 he assembled supplies and transports at Boston for Loudoun's expedition against Louisbourg, and at

Halifax in August he was among those who felt that the attack should not be postponed.



Oneida Lake

Although disappointed by the cancellation of the expedition, Bradstreet was encouraged to learn that William Pitt had become the British prime minister, and he wrote to Lyttleton seeking "a favourable mention." He was quite willing to specify appointments to which he considered himself entitled, such as the governorship of New Jersey, the colonelcy of a regiment of rangers, or the post of quartermaster general. Moreover, once again offering schemes to his superiors, early in September 1757 he sent Lyttleton his thoughts on how Canada could be conquered. For complete victory in North America a three-pronged assault should be launched against the French possessions. One army should reduce Louisbourg and then proceed against Quebec while another should move from Albany to capture forts Carillon (Ticonderoga, N.Y.) and Saint-Frédéric (near Crown Point, N.Y.) and then link up with the third army, which was to attack across Lake Ontario from Oswego. The combined forces should then proceed "in a short time [with] the reduction of the Town of Montreal." Bradstreet thus offered a strategy which bears a striking resemblance to the basic plan that Pitt used to achieve the conquest of Canada in the campaigns of 1758 to 1760.

"Charmed with the Spirit and Enterprising Genius" of Bradstreet, Lyttleton passed his ideas along to Pitt and Lord Ligonier, commander-in-chief of the British army. The latter was definitely influenced by them in drawing up his plans for the 1758 campaign. Quick action followed Bradstreet's request for promotion; on 1 Jan. 1758 Lyttleton reported to Charles Gould with obvious satisfaction that "I have Obtained for our Friend


Bradstreet the rank of *Lt. Col in the Kings Service*, as Deputy Quarter Master General for America."



Lake Ontario

While he was winning promotion in England, Bradstreet was being assigned increasingly important tasks in America. Loudoun ordered him to oversee the construction of bateaux in the Albany region for service on Lake Ontario and the Hudson and St Lawrence rivers in the coming campaign, and he also approved Bradstreet's proposal for an attack on Fort Frontenac in the early spring. These plans were abruptly altered early in March, however, when Loudoun was replaced by James Abercromby. In Pitt's orders to Abercromby, Bradstreet was assigned to quartermaster's duties in the southern colonies. Abercromby was aware of Bradstreet's talents, however, and in "an inspired piece of disobedience" decided to use him in his campaign against Fort Carillon. Accordingly, Bradstreet supervised the construction of bateaux and the movement of men and provisions up the Hudson River in preparation for the attack. When Viscount Howe (George Augustus Howe), Abercromby's second in command, was killed, Bradstreet "took up the slack" since Thomas Gage, now second in command, failed to emerge as a key adviser to Abercromby. With Abercromby's permission he took a force of several thousand regulars and provincials on a more direct route to Carillon than the army had been following. Once before the fort with this advance guard, Bradstreet requested permission to launch an immediate attack. Abercromby did not take "the least Notice" of this request but instead came up with the rest of the army and ordered the attack for the next day. The delay proved costly: on 8 July the strengthened French forces and entrenchments hurled back successive waves of British attackers. Following Abercromby's decision to withdraw, Bradstreet took command at the landing place and converted a near disastrous rush for the boats into an orderly embarkation.

While others licked their wounds in the aftermath of the British defeat, Bradstreet resurrected his proposal for an attack on Fort Frontenac and secured Abercromby's approval. His largely colonial force of approximately 3,000 reached Lake Ontario on 21 August and four days later was within sight of the French fort. Frontenac was in no condition to resist a siege and the fort's commander, Pierre-Jacques Payen de Noyan et de Chavoy, surrendered on the 27th. After plundering, burning, and demolishing the fort, Bradstreet's force retreated to British territory. With this one brilliant stroke the lifeline of the French Great Lakes empire had been severed. More directly, the capture of French provisions at the post, the destruction of the French naval flotilla on Lake Ontario, and the resultant blow to French prestige among the Indians all contributed to the final defeat of New France.



Capture of Fort Frontenac 1758

Bradstreet's triumph was applauded in Great Britain, and he was promptly promoted colonel in America, the promotion being backdated to 20 August. But ironically, although his military career had risen to its apex during Britain's years of defeat, his feelings of frustration and neglect intensified as the victorious years of the British war effort began. Under his new commander, Jeffery Amherst, Bradstreet served as deputy quartermaster general at Albany, winning Amherst's consistent respect for the conscientious performance of his duties. During the preparations for the 1760 campaign Bradstreet's ceaseless diligence caused his health to collapse and brought him to death's door. As Amherst's army embarked upon the final reduction of Canada, Bradstreet remained behind at Oswego, confined to his bed. Although his quartermaster's duties were financially rewarding and indeed increased his political and economic importance in the Albany region, as the war drew to a close he became increasingly concerned at what he considered the British government's failure to reward adequately his contributions to the victory. His cause was not helped by Lyttleton's departure from England in 1760 nor by Pitt's fall from power in 1761, but the faithful Charles Gould continued to solicit on his behalf and in October 1763 secured his appointment as lieutenant governor of either Montreal or Trois-Rivières once Ralph Burton's choice was known. By this time Pontiac's uprising had broken out, and Amherst offered Bradstreet

command of an expedition to the Great Lakes against the Indians. Reasoning that the successful completion of this task would carry more weight with the British government than his service in Canada, he accepted.

The operations planned for 1764 were directed primarily against the Delawares and the Shawnees; Bradstreet was to command a northern force moving from Niagara to Detroit, while Henry Bouquet was to command a southern force moving from Fort Pitt (Pittsburgh, Pa) towards the Muskingum River (Ohio). Unable for various reasons to leave Niagara until early August, and bitterly disappointed at the limited size of his force, Bradstreet convinced himself that his mission was also one of peacemaking. Thus he offered tentative peace terms to an Indian delegation which met him near Fort Presque Isle (Erie, Pa) on 12 August and conducted further negotiations after his arrival at Detroit on 27 August.



Sandusky, Ohio

By mid September Bradstreet had reached Sandusky (Ohio) on his return journey. Gage, who had succeeded Amherst as commander-in-chief, had by now been informed of Bradstreet's peacemaking activities and disavowed them, ordering Bradstreet to launch an overland attack against the Delawares and Shawnees. Bradstreet felt his weakened force was incapable of such a mission and remained at Sandusky until mid October, offering only a potential threat to the Indians and an indirect aid to Bouquet. The journey from Sandusky disintegrated into a nightmarish rout because of storms and lack of supplies, and it was not until 4 November that the remnants of the expedition began to arrive at Niagara. To his credit, Bradstreet had relieved Detroit, helped reopen the various posts on the Upper Lakes, and proved at least an indirect help to Bouquet's more successful campaign. But to Gage and Sir William Johnson, Bradstreet had mismanaged the campaign and exceeded his instructions, and he emerged from the Detroit campaign with his military record and reputation badly tarnished.

After the Detroit disappointment Bradstreet continued to serve as acting deputy quartermaster general at Albany, a virtual sinecure since his

departmental expenditures and responsibilities were cut to the bone by Gage. The unsympathetic Gage remained as commander-in-chief for the remainder of Bradstreet's life, often thwarting his efforts at advancement. Bradstreet prospered financially through land speculation and other dealings, but his military career stagnated. Pet projects such as the establishment of a full-fledged colony at Detroit with himself as governor were still offered to the home authorities, but although the projects were at times carried to the brink of achievement they were ultimately unsuccessful. Equally futile were his requests for the governorships of Massachusetts, New York, or even Canada when he heard that Guy Carleton* contemplated "never returning" in 1770. In 1773 the possibility of his succeeding Gage was still being pursued, and his proposal for a Detroit colony was resubmitted the following year, only to be precluded by the Quebec Act. The old warrior was spared the news of this final rejection, as well as the spectacle of the open revolution he had long expected, since he died at New York City on 25 Sept. 1774. The next day, accompanied by an elaborate funeral *cortège*, Bradstreet's body was borne to its final resting place in Trinity Church.

For an Anglo-American-Acadian a successful career in the mid-18th-century British army was not an easy undertaking. Nevertheless, Bradstreet was able to combine a prominent role in military triumphs with proper timing, well-placed patrons, the support of his commanding officer, and a widespread recognition of his special talents, and he thus did remarkably well. The obscurity surrounding his background and the questionable side of many of his schemes and actions kept him beyond the pale, however. Although valued in a wartime emergency, he remained a somewhat irregular regular.

W. G. Godfrey

[Material concerning John Bradstreet is fairly extensive but widely scattered. The Tredegar Park coll. at the National Library of Wales (Aberystwyth) contains the immensely rewarding Bradstreet-Gould correspondence. At the PAC numerous collections (in microfilm and transcript) touch upon Bradstreet's activities. Among the more important are the Amherst family papers (MG 18, L4), AN, Col., C^{11B} (MG 1), Nova Scotia A (MG 11, [CO 217]), PRO, Adm.1 (MG 12), CO 5, CO 194, CO 217 (MG 11), PRO 30/8 (MG 23, A2), and WO 1 (MG 13). At the PANS, RG 1, 5-26, 29-30, 34-35, and 38 were helpful. The Clements Library houses the extensive Thomas Gage papers; the American series contains substantial correspondence between Gage and Bradstreet. The American Antiquarian Soc. (Worcester, Mass.) has the John Bradstreet papers, 1755-77, and the New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Archives Division, has the somewhat disappointing Philip Schuyler papers. Both the New York Hist. Soc. (New York) and the New York State Library (Albany) have miscellaneous items dealing with Bradstreet. The Huntington Library has the Abercromby and Loudoun papers, which are worthwhile, particularly the latter, and the Mass. Hist. Soc. has the equally useful Belknap papers.

Among the more important printed primary sources are [John Bradstreet], *An impartial account of Lieut. Col. Bradstreet's expedition to*

Fort Frontenac . . . (London, 1759; repr. Toronto, 1940); *The Colden letter books* (2v., N.Y. Hist. Soc., *Coll.*, [ser.3], IX, X, New York, 1876–77); *Correspondence of General Thomas Gage* (Carter); *Correspondence of William Pitt* (Kimball); *Correspondence of William Shirley* (Lincoln); *Diary of the siege of Detroit* . . . , ed. F. B. Hough (Albany, N.Y., 1860); *The documentary history of the state of New-York* . . . , ed. E. B. O’Callaghan (4v., Albany, 1849–51), I, IV; G.B., PRO, CSP, *col.*, 1710–11 to 1738; *Johnson papers* (Sullivan et al.); *The Lee papers* (2v., N.Y. Hist. Soc., *Coll.*, [ser.3], IV, V, New York, 1871–72), I; *Louisbourg journals, 1745*, ed. L. E. De Forest (New York, 1932); Mass. Hist. Soc., *Coll.*, 1st ser., I (1792), VII (1800); 4th ser., V (1861), IX (1871), X (1871); 6th ser., VI (1893), X (1899); *Military affairs in North America, 1748–65* (Pargellis); *NYCD* (O’Callaghan and Fernow), VII, VIII, X; *Royal Fort Frontenac* (Preston and Lamontagne).

Bradstreet has never been examined in a full-length biography. S. McC. Pargellis contributed the brief biographical sketch in *DAB*. Arthur Pound attempted a more detailed look in *Native stock: the rise of the American spirit seen in six lives* (New York, 1931), but his account is exaggerated and inaccurate. Harvey Chalmers’ historical novel *Drums against Frontenac* (New York, 1949) paints a fascinating, albeit largely imaginary, picture. Because of Bradstreet’s participation in so many of the mid 18th-century American military campaigns, he is frequently mentioned but is only rarely subject to detailed examination. Examples are Frégault, *François Bigot*; L. H. Gipson, *The British empire before the American revolution* (15v., Caldwell, Idaho, and New York, 1936–70), VII; McLennan, *Louisbourg*; Pargellis, *Lord Loudoun*; Usher Parsons, *The life of Sir William Pepperrell, bart.* . . . (2nd ed., Boston and London, 1856); Rawlyk, *Yankees at Louisbourg*; Shy, *Toward Lexington*; Stanley, *New France*; and Rex Whitworth, *Field Marshal Lord Ligonier: a story of the British army, 1702–1770* (Oxford, 1958).

The only recent detailed studies of particular phases of Bradstreet’s career are W. G. Godfrey, “John Bradstreet at Louisbourg: emergence or re-emergence?” *Acadiensis*, IV (1974), no.1, 100–20, and Peter Marshall, “Imperial policy and the government of Detroit: projects and problems, 1760–1774,” *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* (London), II (1974), 153–89. A full-length study of Bradstreet’s career in dissertation form is W. G. Godfrey, “John Bradstreet: an irregular regular, 1714–1774” (unpublished phd thesis, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ont., 1974). w.g.g.]



George Washington (February 22, 1732^[1] – December 14, 1799) commanded the Continental Army in American Revolutionary War (1775–1783), and was the first President of the United States, serving from 1789 to 1797. Because of his central role in the founding of the United States, Washington is often called the "Father of his Country". His devotion to republicanism and civic virtue made him an exemplary figure among early American politicians.

George Washington's military career presents the most outstanding illustration of a characteristic peculiarly his own, that he did not mark time in any of the important positions of his life. His passion for education caused him to concentrate on hard study, to acquire the necessary knowledge to excel, whether it was surveying, farming, building forts, shipping produce, or leading armies.

One of the many legends woven around the life of George Washington claims that his father discovered the child's military bent when he was quite a small boy and gave him a toy sword which delighted him greatly. While there is no more documentary evidence to prove the truth of this story than

there is of the original cherry tree tale and the highly-colored romances attributed to his young manhood, it is definitely shown that he inherited the military tendency of the Washingtons and that this received decided impetus by the military atmosphere created through the activities prevailing in the colony of Virginia in the raising of the troops to be sent to the West Indies to combat the Spaniards.

Lawrence Washington, the elder of George's two stepbrothers, 14 years his senior, had offered his services and had been commissioned captain in the contingent that sailed in 1740 to join the combined expeditions of Admiral Vernon and General Wentworth. Little 8-year-old George may well have experienced all of a small boy's thrilling excitement and admiration over watching the drilling and preparations for departure of Lawrence and his comrades for the scene of war.



Mount Vernon

The love of military affairs did not abate and pass as most boyish enthusiasms do, but developed into a fixed interest which was strengthened when the loved elder brother returned two years later and continued his own military associations by becoming adjutant of his district in Virginia with the rank of major.

Having inherited the plantation on the Potomac which he renamed Mount Vernon and taken himself Miss Anne Fairfax to wife, Lawrence Washington drew about him an exclusive circle of the best people of the colony, and retained his interest in both military and naval matters. Association with these men of society and affairs was of the greatest benefit and advantage

to young George during the impressionable period of his life and enhanced and encouraged what was probably a natural military predilection.



The determination of both France and England to secure and hold the supremacy of the Mississippi Valley, and the growing indications of an impending contest between them, brought about a revival of the military spirit in the colony of Virginia, and through it came active preparations for any part she might be called upon to take in consequence. This matter vitally interested Lawrence Washington, who was associated with the Ohio Company recently organized to develop the region over the mountains, and while there is a lack of record on the fact, it seems evident that, with the aid of former army companions, such as Van Braam and George Muse, he had his young brother not only instructed in fencing but also in the elements of military science. From the beginning of George Washington's writings upon his military experience there are evidences of great natural ability and also of training. Hence, when in 1752 Governor Dinwiddie appointed him a district adjutant of the militia, with the rank of major, there was probably in it a recognition that, in spite of youth, Washington possessed the requirements for the task.

To his military training he undoubtedly gave the same concentrated study that distinguished his school life and the study of surveying. He seemed to have been possessed of a passion to acquire all available knowledge on matters of paramount interest to him. His exercise books before he was 16, which have been preserved, show an unusual grasp of mathematics.

Regarding his knowledge of this science as manifested in these books, Charles Moore wrote:

"The one devoted to Mathematics exhibits a wide range of subjects combined with sureness and accuracy in working and clearness and neatness of presentation. Few graduates of colleges today, unless they specialize in mathematics, become as well trained in that subject."



When it became necessary to take some action in regard to what was considered French encroachments upon English territory on the Ohio, Governor Dinwiddie followed the example of Lord Fairfax and selected Major Washington for the job. This was the second instance of the effect of George Washington's personality upon older people. The impression of efficiency, dependability, and high courage, which from boyhood had radiated from him, made an extraordinary impression upon those with whom he came in contact. This quality never left him, and it has never been disputed. It carried with it an unspoken assurance that he was fitted by some remarkable combination of talents for tasks he was willing to undertake, and that he would carry them through to successful completion if that were possible. While in others of his extreme youth the years may have implied limitations in the expectations focused upon his endeavors, this never seemed to be considered in respect to the tasks put upon his shoulders.

This quality was first recognized by Lord Fairfax, who marked by his confidence and comradeship the fitting of a man's tasks to the square young shoulders of a boy without cutting those tasks to a boy's measure. Just as George Washington stepped into a man-sized job as a surveyor, so when he accepted Governor Dinwiddie's mission to the Ohio he stepped not only into a man-sized task but into a path which led, as we now are able to trace it, directly to the American independence, of which he was the chosen instrument.



Great Meadows

His training, whether theoretical in military elements or practical in surveying and frontier life, had fitted him for the duty. Through his knowledge of the rugged, hazardous life of the scattered, isolated pioneers beyond the settlements and the extreme hardships and emergencies of dangers to be met and combated in transportation, afoot, on horseback, or by canoe, he was not only grounded in self-reliance and resourcefulness, but what was a marvelous advantage for the man destined to lead a nation through eight years of war to victory was that he was wholly fearless. Never was George Washington known to feel or exhibit any fear in any situation. He is credited with saying that fear was absent from his make-up, and he could not tolerate cowardice in others.

By 1753 the situation on the Ohio region had become so serious through the French occupation, and their efforts to attach the Indians to them against the English, that Governor Dinwiddie, under orders from England, prepared a letter for the French commander which he intrusted to Major Washington for delivery, as it was a mission of greatest difficulty and

danger, and of utmost importance not only that the letter be gotten to the French commandant but that a full report of the situation, the location of the forts, etc., be brought back. One messenger had already returned, beaten and baffled by the dangers, before making any real headway, and the colonial governor pinned all of his faith to the young officer whose fearlessness, masterfulness, and good judgement had already made for him a place of distinction among his fellows.



Major Washington began his journey on October 3, 1753; and though beset with the greatest difficulties, extreme hardships, and actual endangerment of life, he completed this mission January 16, 1754, when he brought to Governor Dinwiddie the important reply and his own report with a map. This report which, although hastily written in a few hours from his daily journal, demonstrated George Washington's ability clearly and forcefully to express his thoughts in writing, the governor had it printed immediately, and it helped to arouse the Colonies and British Government to the importance and difficulties of the problem.

Pending Washington's report, preparations had already been begun by the Ohio Company to build a fort at the junction of the Allegheny and the Monongahela Rivers, and to complete and defend this a regiment of Virginia volunteers was ordered recruited. Washington was commissioned on March 15, 1754, lieutenant colonel as second in command under Colonel Joshua Fry with the main body of the regiment later. But before the small detachment got over the mountains the French ejected the little group of about 40 engaged upon the fort, took possession, and renamed it Fort Duquesne.

Washington continued his march and held parleys with the Indians. On May 28 he attacked and captured a reconnoitering French force, and in doing so started the French and Indian War. Not succeeding in attaching the Indians to the English side and finding his advanced position otherwise untenable, he started to retire, but on July 3 surrendered to the French his hastily constructed works, called Fort Necessity. He had put up a valiant fight and was permitted to continue his march back to the Potomac. This was the only time he ever surrendered.

The news of this skirmish aroused both French and English to the immanence of conflict between them. However chagrined Colonel Washington may have felt over his first baptism of war, his position was so entirely all that could be expected that he received the thanks of the House of Burgesses.



The next turn in the wheel of fate brought General Braddock to America at the head of 2,000 smart British Regulars. He was a gallant officer of distinguished record, but he was totally unfitted to cope with the Indian warfare, although convinced that he and the British Regulars would be impervious to any mishap, an opinion in which Washington and other colonists who were familiar with Indian warfare may not have agreed, in spite of the traditional respect for the professional.

Considerable dissatisfaction had been aroused by the King's order that all provincial commissions were inferior in rank to the royal ones. General Braddock, having heard of Colonel Washington's exploits, invited him to become a special aid "in his family, by which all inconvenience of that kind

will be obviated." To this invitation Colonel Washington replied, acknowledging frankly --

"an inclination to serve the ensuing campaign as a volunteer; and this inclination is not a little increased, since it is likely to be conducted by a gentleman of the General's experience. but, besides this, and the laudable desire I may have to serve, with my best abilities, my King and country, I must be ingenuous enough to confess, that I am not a little biassed by selfish considerations. To explain, Sir, I wish earnestly to attain some knowledge in the military profession, and, believing a more favorable opportunity cannot offer, than to serve under a gentleman of General Braddock's abilities and experience, it does, as may be reasonably suppose, not a little contribute to influence my choice."



The catastrophe which followed, bringing to young Colonel Washington much bitter disillusionment and great responsibility, is best gathered from his letter to Governor Dinwiddie, giving his first account of the defeat of Braddock and his forces, July 9, 1755:

"We continue our March from Fort Cumberland to Frazier's (which is within 7 miles of Duquesne) without meeting any extraordinary event, having only a straggler or two picked up by the French Indians. When we came to this place, we were attacked (very unexpectedly) by about three hundred French and Indians. Our numbers consisted of about thirteen hundred well armed men, chiefly Regulars, who were immediately struck with such an inconceivable panick, that nothing but confusion and disobedience of orders prevailed among them. The officers, in general, behaved with incomparable bravery, for which they greatly suffered, there being near 600 killed and wounded--a large proportion, out of the number we had! The Virginia companies behaved like men and died like soldiers; for I believe out of three companies that were on the ground that day scarce thirty were left alive. Capt. Payronney and all his officers, down to a corporal, were killed; Capt. Polson had almost as hard a fate, for only one of his escaped. In short, the dastardly behaviour of the Regular troops (so-called) exposed those who were inclined to do their duty to almost certain death; and, at

length, in spite of every effort to the contrary, broke and ran as sheep before hounds, leaving the artillery, ammunition, provisions, baggage, and in short, everything a prey to the enemy. And when we endeavoured to rally them, in hopes of regaining the ground and what we had left upon it, it was with as little success as if we had attempted to have stopped the wild bears of the mountains, or rivulets with our feet; for they would break by, in despite of every effort that could be made to prevent it."

In another letter George Washington expressed his utter disgust at the debacle, so contrary to the valor and record of the British Regular troops. He wrote:

"It is true, we have been beaten, shamefully beaten, by a handful of men, who only intended to molest and disturb our march. Victory was their smallest expectation. . . had I not been witness to the fact on that fatal day, I should scarce have given credit to it even now."

The British Regulars would have acquitted themselves with credit on a formal battle ground of Europe, but in the wilds of the American forests with Indians fighting from ambush they were helpless and terrified. George Washington had been so ill that on the march he had had to ride in one of the wagons, but was beside General Braddock at the time of the attack. As the other aides had soon been wounded, the carrying of the General's orders fell upon him. In constant danger, two horse were shot from under him, and four bullets went through his clothes. Although reported killed, he attributed his preservation to the all-powerful dispensations of Providence. Out of 1,373 noncommissioned officers and men, only 453 came off unharmed. Washington, however, underestimated considerably the French and Indian force.

The immediate effect of the defeat of Braddock's forces was disastrous; for Colonel Dunbar, who commanded the rear of Braddock's Army that had not participated in the battle, refused, after receiving the fugitives, to advance or even to stand his ground, but retreated to Fort Cumberland and then decided to place himself and his troops out of reach of such border warfare and withdrew his men to Philadelphia, leaving the entire border at the mercy of the raids of the French and Indians.

This emergency brought forth the convening of the House of Burgesses of the colony of Virginia by Governor Dinwiddie, which voted 40,000 pounds and authorized the raising of a regiment of 1,000 men. The governor gave George Washington a commission as colonel and commander in chief of all of the forces raised in Virginia for the protection of the frontier. This commission was the answer to the general demand for the services of George Washington, whose actions under all emergencies had been and unusual tribute to the qualities of a 23-year-old officer. To him it meant a constant struggle to organize forces for the defense of the border without the necessary means with which to do so. He made sound and practical plans, but was not permitted to get them beyond the beginning of the central Fort Loudoun at Winchester. His own desire was for offensive operations, but he was overruled and forced to abide by the policy of a chain of small fortified posts, so poorly provided with men for their defense

that they were helpless to defend their surrounding territory against Indian raids, which were growing steadily in frequency and in atrocity.

George Washington was gravely disturbed over the situation, and he wrote many letters in his efforts to induce the authorities to provide him with adequate means to protect the border settlers. One of these shows how deeply he was stirred by the conditions:

"I see their situation, know their danger, and participate in their sufferings, without having it in my power to give them further relief, than uncertain promises. In short, I see inevitable destruction in so clear a light, that, unless vigorous measures are taken by the Assembly, and speedy assistance sent from below, the poor inhabitants that are now in forts, must unavoidably fall while the remainder of the country are flying before the barbarous foe . . . The supplicating tears of women, and moving petitions from the men, melt me into such deadly sorrow, that I solemnly declare, if I know my own mind, I could offer myself a willing sacrifice to the butchering enemy, provided that would contribute to the people's ease."



Monongahela wilderness

The Virginia authorities made some efforts to remedy these troubles, but there was a lack of intercolonial cooperation, and under the commanding generalship of Lord Loudoun, Virginia was not only left to its own defense but required to send troops to south Carolina. Recruiting was slow. Men were not willing to leave their homes and families, and George Washington had a most arduous service in trying to defend 350 miles of frontier with less than a thousand men. This condition continued through 1756-57. For two years there was nothing but a series of failures under Lord Loudoun until he was recalled. Then, when William Pitt became Prime Minister, the tide of the war turned in American. Under his able administration the British actually began to send substantial military forces into America, with strong naval force to supplement them. France did not match these moves, and the French forces in America were abandoned to their fate. It was not until 1758 that the change of affairs brought relief to George Washington. He had

always urged that an expedition be sent to Fort Duquesne, a center of border depredations, to destroy it. At last, in 1758, the expedition was made a part of the energetic program for the year. The expedition was to be under Brigadier General Forbes, and Washington was to lead the Virginia troops, which had then been augmented to about 2,000. There were many long delays owing to the difficulty of preparations. This was the time when, owing to the shortage of regimental clothing, George Washington decided to fit out his command in the light Indian hunting garb. This was a first departure from the cumbersome uniforms of the period. George Washington pointed out the advantages in comfort and the greater reduction of impedimenta to be transported. The serviceability of this Indian costume soon proved its utility, and George Washington was responsible for introducing an equipment which was to be of great value to Americans later in the Revolution.




George Washington was eager to move forward in short order, following the road made under such difficulty by Braddock. However, while these matters were being settled, he met, loved and wooed Martha Custis, and when he did start his march to Fort Duquesne, they were betrothed. Another honor came to him while on military duty. This was his election to the House of Burgesses of Virginia as representative for Frederick County. Military duty kept him from the polls, but he was elected by a large majority.

A notable contrast to General Braddock's disregard of George Washington's advice was the respect tendered his military opinions by General Forbes, who asked the young officer to make for him a plan of march, a tactical scheme for the conduct of an expeditionary force of 4,000 men. It was also astonishing to find the young officer fully prepared to offer the right solution to the problem with tactics so flexible as to change quickly a line of march

into a battle line in the event of an attack. The value of this plan was so apparent that it was adopted and followed.

The above proves that George Washington had a grasp of military matters that was extraordinary. General Forbes's expedition advanced with painful slowness. Colonel Bouquet, who had advocated the new route, was energetic, but the making of the new road through the wilderness was very difficult, and the approach to Fort Duquesne was delayed until in danger of being halted by the winter weather. However, it was all settled by the capture of Fort Frontenac. After the defeat of General Abercromby in his attack on Fort Ticonderoga, July 8, 1758, Fort Frontenac had been left with only a little over a hundred men to garrison it and was therefore easily captured in August by a brilliant dash of Colonel Bradstreet across Lake Ontario with a force of 2,500 colonial troops. The loss of this valuable French post cut the French line of communications, and by the time the Forbes expedition appeared the weakened forces at Fort Duquesne abandoned their isolated position. They had routed a rash advance force under Grant, but abandoned by their Indian allies, they could not withstand the main body and after burning their fort retreated up the Allegheny. It saved the situation, for General Forbes was then fatally ill. The fort was made defensible and renamed by him Fort Pitt (afterwards Pittsburgh). Two hundred of Washington's Virginians were left as a garrison, and the expedition returned to Virginia. The downfall of Fort Duquesne ended the border troubles, just as George Washington had predicted it would, as it had been the base of all the Indian raiding activities. The restoration of order on the border ended the war for Virginia; the French being driven away, the end of 1758 was the end of George Washington's military service in the French and Indian War.



Iroquois Location

The original homeland of the Iroquois was in upstate New York between the Adirondack Mountains and Niagara Falls. Through conquest and migration, they gained control of most of the northeastern United States and eastern Canada. At its maximum in 1680, their empire extended west from the north shore of Chesapeake Bay through Kentucky to the junction of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers; then north following the Illinois River to the south end of Lake Michigan; east across all of lower Michigan, southern Ontario and adjacent parts of southwestern Quebec; and finally south through northern New England west of the Connecticut River through the Hudson and upper Delaware Valleys across Pennsylvania back to the Chesapeake. With two exceptions - the Mingo occupation of the upper Ohio Valley and the Caughnawaga migration to the upper St. Lawrence - the Iroquois did not, for the most part, physically occupy this vast area but remained in their upstate New York villages.

During the hundred years preceding the American Revolution, wars with French-allied Algonquin and British colonial settlement forced them back within their original boundaries once again. Their decision to side with the British during the Revolutionary War was a disaster for the Iroquois. The American invasion of their homeland in 1779 drove many of the Iroquois into southern Ontario where they have remained. With large Iroquois communities already located along the upper St. Lawrence in Quebec at the time, roughly half of the Iroquois population has since lived in Canada. This includes most of the Mohawk along with representative groups from the

other tribes. Although most Iroquois reserves are in southern Ontario and Quebec, one small group (Michel's band) settled in Alberta during the 1800s as part of the fur trade.

In the United States, much of the Iroquois homeland was surrendered to New York land speculators in a series of treaties following the Revolutionary War. Despite this, most Seneca, Tuscarora, and Onondaga avoided removal during the 1830s and have remained in New York. There are also sizeable groups of Mohawk, Oneida, Cayuga, and Caughnawaga still in the state. Most of the Oneida, however, relocated in 1838 to a reservation near Green Bay, Wisconsin. The Cayuga sold their New York lands in 1807 and moved west to join the Mingo relatives (Seneca of Sandusky) in Ohio. In 1831 this combined group ceded their Ohio reserve to the United States and relocated to the Indian Territory. A few New York Seneca moved to Kansas at this time but, after the Civil War, joined the others in northeast Oklahoma to become the modern Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma.

Population

Considering their impact on history, it is amazing how few Iroquois there were in 1600 - probably less than 20,000 for all five tribes. Their inland location protected them somewhat from the initial European epidemics, but these had reached them by 1650 and, combined with warfare, cut their population to about half of its original number. However, unlike other native populations which continued to drop, the Iroquois, through the massive adoption of conquered Iroquian-speaking enemies (at least 7,000 Huron, and similar numbers of [Neutrals](#), [Susquehannock](#), [Tionontati](#), and [Erie](#)), actually increased and reached their maximum number in 1660, about 25,000. Absorption of this many outsiders was not without major problems - not the least of which was the Iroquois became a minority within their own confederacy.

For the moment, the Iroquois talent for diplomacy and political unity kept things under control, but forces which would destroy them had been set in motion. On the positive side, the adoptions gave the Iroquois a claim to the lands of their former enemies beyond mere "right of conquest." Mass adoption, however, was not extended to non-Iroquian speaking tribes, and from this point the Iroquois population dropped. Despite the incorporation of 1,500 Tuscarora in 1722 as a sixth member of the League, the Iroquois numbered only 12,000 in 1768. By the end of the Revolutionary War, they were less than 8,000. From that point there has been a slow recovery followed by a recent surge as renewed native pride has prompted many to reclaim their heritage. The 1940 census listed only 17,000 Iroquois in both New York and Canada, but current figures approach 70,000 at about 20 settlements and 8 reservations in New York, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Ontario, and Quebec.

Approximately 30,000 of these live in the United States. Of 3,500 Cayuga, 3,000 are in Canada as part of the Six Nations of the Grand River Reserve near Brantford, Ontario. The 500 in the United States live mostly on the Seneca Reservations in western New York. There are also Cayuga among

the 2,500 member Seneca-Cayuga tribe in northeastern Oklahoma - descendants of the Mingo of Ohio. The Oneida were once one of the smaller Iroquois tribes but currently number more than 16,000. The largest group (almost 11,000) lives on or near their 2,200 acre reservation west of Green Bay, Wisconsin. Another 700 still live near Oneida, New York, but since their 32 acre reserve is so small, many are forced to live with the nearby Onondaga. Ontario has 4,600 Oneida split between the 2,800 Oneida of the Thames near London and the Grand River Reserve with the Six Nations.

1,600 Onondaga still live in New York, mainly on a 7,300 acre reservation just south of Syracuse. Another 600 are at the Grand River Reserve in Ontario which has members from all six Iroquois tribes. This includes 200 Tuscarora, but the majority (1,200) live on the Tuscarora Reservation (5,000 acres) near Niagara Falls, New York. The Seneca were once the largest tribe of the Iroquois League - the number of their warriors equal to the other four tribes combined. Their current enrollment stands at 9,100, 1,100 of whom are in Ontario at Grand River. There are four Seneca Reserves in western New York: Allegheny, Cattaraugus, Oil Springs, and Tonawanda (total 60,000 acres). There was once a fifth Seneca reservation, but only 100 of the original 9,000 acres of the Cornplanter grant in northern Pennsylvania remain after it was flooded by a dam project in the 1960s. The Seneca, however, are the only Native American tribe to own an American city - Salamanca, New York.

The Mohawk are the largest group of Iroquois with more than 35,000 members. Some estimates of pre-contact Mohawk population range as high as 17,000 although half this is probably closer to the truth. War and epidemic took a terrible toll, and by 1691 the Mohawk had less than 800 people. A large group of Caughnawaga live in Brooklyn (ironworkers), but the only American Mohawk reservation is at St. Regis on the New York-Quebec border with 7,700 members. Straddling the border as the Akwesasne reserve, the Canadian part has a population of 5,700. Almost 12,000 Mohawk live in Ontario as Six Nations of the Grand River, Watha Mohawk Nation, and the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte at Tyendenaga (Deseronto) on the north shore of Lake Ontario west of Kingston. The remainder of the Canadian Mohawk live in Quebec near Montreal: 8,200 at Kahnawake (Caughnawaga); and 1,800 at Oka (Kanesatake, Lac des Deux Montagnes).

Culture

Simply put, the Iroquois were the most important native group in North American history. Culturally, however, there was little to distinguish them from their Iroquian-speaking neighbors. All had matrilineal social structures - the women owned all property and determined kinship. The individual Iroquois tribes were divided into three clans, turtle, bear, and wolf - each headed by the clan mother. The Seneca were like the Huron tribes and had eight (the five additional being the crane, snipe, hawk, beaver, and deer). After marriage, a man moved into his wife's longhouse, and their children became members of her clan. Iroquois villages were generally fortified and large. The distinctive, communal longhouses of the different clans could be over 200' in length and were built about a framework covered with elm

bark, the Iroquois' material of choice for all manner of things. Villages were permanent in the sense they were moved only for defensive purposes or when the soil became exhausted (about every twenty years).



Agriculture provided most of the Iroquois diet. Corn, beans, and squash were known as "deohako" or "life supporters." Their importance to the Iroquois was clearly demonstrated by the six annual agricultural festivals held with prayers of gratitude for their harvests. The women owned and tended the fields under the supervision of the clan mother. Men usually left the village in the fall for the annual hunt and returned about midwinter. Spring was fishing season. Other than clearing fields and building villages, the primary occupation of the men was warfare. Warriors wore their hair in a distinctive scalplock (Mohawk of course), although other styles became common later. While the men carefully removed all facial and body hair, women wore theirs long. Tattoos were common for both sexes. Torture and ritual cannibalism were some of the ugly traits of the Iroquois, but these were shared with several other tribes east of the Mississippi. The False Face society was an Iroquois healing group which utilized grotesque wooden masks to frighten the evil spirits believed to cause illness.

It was the Iroquois political system, however, that made them unique, and because of it, they dominated the first 200-years of colonial history in both Canada and the United States. Strangely enough, there were never that many of them, and the enemies they defeated in war were often twice their size. Although much has been made of their Dutch firearms, the Iroquois prevailed because of their unity, sense of purpose, and superior political organization. Since the Iroquois League was formed prior to any contact, it owed nothing to European influence. Proper credit is seldom given, but the reverse was actually true. Rather than learning political sophistication from Europeans, Europeans learned from the Iroquois, and the League, with its elaborate system of checks, balances,, and supreme law, almost certainly influenced the American Articles of Confederation and Constitution.

The Iroquois were farmers whose leaders were chosen by their women - rather unusual for warlike conquerors. Founded to maintain peace and resolve disputes between its members, the League's primary law was the Kainerekowa, the Great Law of Peace which simply stated Iroquois should not kill each other. The League's organization was prescribed by a written constitution based on 114 wampums and reinforced by a funeral rite known as the "Condolence" - shared mourning at the passing of sachems from the member tribes. The council was composed of 50 male sachems known variously as lords, or peace chiefs. Each tribe's representation was set: Onondaga 14; Cayuga 10; Oneida 9; Mohawk 9; and Seneca 8. Nominated by the tribal clan mothers (who had almost complete power in their selection), Iroquois sachemships were usually held for life, although they could be removed for misconduct or incompetence. The emblem of their office was the deer antler head dress, and guided by an all-male council, the sachems ruled in times of peace. War chiefs were chosen on the basis of birth, experience, and ability, but exercised power only during war.

The central authority of the Iroquois League was limited leaving each tribe free to pursue its own interests. By 1660, however, the Iroquois found it necessary to present a united front to Europeans, and the original freedom of its members had to be curtailed somewhat. In practice, the Mohawk and Oneida formed one faction in the council and the Seneca and Cayuga the other. The League's principal sachem (Tadodaho) was always an Onondaga, and as "keepers of the council fire" with 14 sachems (well out of proportion to their population), they represented compromise. This role was crucial since all decisions of the council had to be unanimous, one of the League's weaknesses. There was also a "pecking order" among members reflected by the eloquent ritual language of League debate. Mohawk, Onondaga, and Seneca were addressed as "elder brothers" or "uncles," while Oneida, Cayuga, and Tuscarora were "younger brothers" or "nephews."

In this form, the Iroquois used a combination of military prowess and skilled diplomacy to conquer an empire. Until their internal unity finally failed them during the American Revolution, the Iroquois dealt with European powers as an equal. The League was a remarkable achievement, but it also had flaws, the most apparent was its inability to find a satisfactory means to share political power with its new members. As mentioned, the Iroquois incorporated thousands of non-league Iroquian peoples during the 1650s. Political power was retained by the original Iroquois to such an extent that

the adoptees remained second-class citizens. The resulting dissatisfaction eventually led to the Mingo separating and moving to Ohio to free themselves from League control. Others found refuge with the French at Caughnawaga and other Jesuit missions along the St. Lawrence.

The League's massive adoptions also explains why it was so relentless in its pursuit of the remnants of defeated enemies. So long as one small band remained free, the Iroquois were in danger of an insurrection from within. Perhaps because they considered themselves "Ongwi Honwi" (superior people), the Iroquois never offered wholesale adoption to the non-Iroquian speaking peoples who came under their control. Instead they offered membership in the "Covenant Chain," a terminology first suggested by the Dutch at a treaty signed with the Mohawk in 1618. By 1677 the Iroquois had extended this form of limited membership to the Mahican and [Delaware](#) and later would offer it to other Algonquin and Siouan tribes. Essentially, the Covenant Chain was a trade and military alliance which gave the Iroquois the authority to represent its members with Europeans, but there was no vote or direct representation in the League council, Worse yet, the Iroquois were often arrogant and placed their own interests first. A system of "half-kings" created to represent the Ohio tribes in the 1740s never really corrected this problem.

A list of all noteworthy Iroquois would be too long to be included here. The Seneca chief, Eli Parker (Donehogawa) was the Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the Grant Administration. Educated as a lawyer, he was admitted to the bar but not allowed to practice in New York. He served on Grant's staff during the Civil War and is believed to have written the terms of Lee's surrender at Appomattox. Catherine Tekawitha, the Lily of the Mohawk (1656-80) has reached the final stage before recognition as a saint by the Roman Catholic Church. The Mohawk have gained fame as structural ironworkers. Hired as laborers in 1896 during the construction of the Dominion Bridge at Montreal, they showed no fear of height and have since been involved in the construction of every major bridge and skyscraper. 35 Mohawk were among the 96 killed in 1907 when a bridge being built across the St. Lawrence at Quebec collapsed.

History

Archeological evidence indicates the Iroquois had lived in upstate New York for a long time before the Europeans arrived. Longhouse construction dates to at least 1100 A.D. The maize agriculture was introduced in the 14th century prompting a population surge and other changes. By 1350 villages had become larger and fortified due to increased warfare, and ritual cannibalism began around 1400. The Onondaga were the first of the Iroquois tribes that can be positively identified in New York and seems to have begun after the merger of two villages sometime between 1450 and 1475. The origin of the other four tribes is not as certain. According to Iroquois tradition, they were once a single tribe in the St. Lawrence Valley subject to Algonquin-speaking Adirondack who had taught them agriculture. To escape Algonquin domination, the Iroquois say they left the St. Lawrence and moved south to New York where they split into opposing tribes.



The exact date of this migration is uncertain. When Jacques Cartier first explored the St. Lawrence in 1535, there were Iroquoian-speaking peoples living in at least eleven villages between Stadacona (Quebec) and Hochelaga (Montreal). Hochelaga was a large fortified village with large corn fields and a population over 3,000. It was still there during Cartier's second visit (1541-42), but when the French returned to the area in 1603, Hochelaga and the other Iroquois villages on the St. Lawrence had disappeared. In their place were Montagnais and Algonkin. For lack of a better term, these Iroquoian people have been called the Laurentian Iroquois, but their exact relationship to other Iroquoian groups has never been established. Both the Huron and Mohawk traditions claim them as their own. Linguistic evidence tends to support the Huron, but it is quite possible the Laurentian Iroquois may have been part of the Mohawk.


Equally confused is the exact date of the founding of the Iroquois League. Some estimates put this as far back as 900 A.D., but the general consensus is sometime around 1570. There is no question, however, that all of the Iroquoian confederacies (Neutrals, Susquehannock, Huron, and Iroquois) were established prior to European contact. Nor is there any dispute over why this occurred. Although still threatened by the Adirondack after moving to upstate New York, the greatest danger for the Iroquois was themselves. Relationships between the tribes had deteriorated into constant war, blood feuds, and revenge killings. In danger of self-destruction, the Iroquois were saved by the sudden appearance of a Huron holyman known as the "Peacemaker." Deganawida (Two River Currents Flowing Together) received a vision from the Creator of peace and cooperation among all Iroquois. Apparently he was hindered by either a language or speech difficulty, but Deganawida eventually won the support of Hiawatha (Ayawentha - He Makes Rivers), an Onondaga who had become a Mohawk war chief.

With considerable effort, they were able to convince the other Iroquois tribes to end their fighting and join together in a league. Legend tells that Deganawida blotted out the sun to convince the reluctant. A solar eclipse visible in upstate New York occurred in 1451 suggesting another possible date for these events. The formation of the League ended the warfare between its members bringing the Iroquois a period of unprecedented peace and prosperity. It also brought political unity and military power, and unfortunately, Deganawida's "Great Peace" extended only to the Iroquois themselves. For outsiders it was a military alliance and the "Great War" against any people with whom the Iroquois had a dispute, and during the first 130 years of the League's existence, there were very few tribes who managed to avoid a dispute with the Iroquois.

The Iroquois were only required to maintain peace with each other, the individual members of the League were free to pursue their own interests, and at first, the Iroquois functioned as two alliances: the Seneca, Cayuga, and, to a lesser extent, the Onondaga combined as the western Iroquois; while the Mohawk and Oneida united in the east. Despite this division, the Iroquois still possessed a unity and purpose which their enemies could not match. During a 50-year war beginning sometime around 1570, the eastern Iroquois drove the Algonquin from the Adirondack Mountains and the upper St. Lawrence River - a possible explanation of the movement of the Pequot and Mohegan into southern New England just after 1600. There were also skirmishes with the powerful [Mahican](#) Confederacy to the south over the wampum trade, and most likely because they were Adirondack or Mahican allies, the [Pocumtuc](#) in western New England were attacked by the Mohawk in 1606. After establishing a settlement at Quebec, the French reached west to the vicinity of Montreal in 1609. What they found there was a war zone where it was possible to travel along the St. Lawrence for days without seeing another human being. The Algonkin and Montagnais were so harassed by Mohawk war parties that they usually remained well-clear of the river.

The French only wanted to trade for fur. Their potential trading partners, however, wanted help fighting the Mohawk which trapped the French into winning their loyalty by jumping into someone else's war. It must have

seemed a trivial at the time, but it proved a fateful decision. In July, 1609 Samuel de Champlain accompanied a Huron, Montagnais, and Algonkin war party which moved south along the shores of Lake Champlain. When they encountered Mohawk warriors, a battle followed during which French guns broke the massed Mohawk formation killing several war chiefs. The following year, Champlain joined another attack against a Mohawk fort on the Richelieu River. Although the Mohawk soon discarded mass formations, wooden body armor, and countered French firearms by falling to the ground just before they discharged, they were driven from the St. Lawrence after 1610. The Algonkin and Montagnais took control of the area and its fur trade for the next twenty years. Meanwhile, the French pushed west to the Huron villages and, in a similar error in 1615, participated in an attack on the Onondaga.



During the years following, the French paid dearly for their intervention. Iroquois hostility prevented them from using Lake Ontario and forced a detour through the Ottawa River Valley to reach the western Great Lakes. For the moment, however, the Iroquois needed guns and steel weapons to protect themselves, but these were available only through a fur trade controlled by their enemies. In 1610 Dutch traders arrived in the Hudson Valley of New York, and the Iroquois had solved a part of their problem. Still pressed from the north by the Huron, Algonkin, and Montagnais, the Mohawk in 1615 were also fighting their traditional Susquehannock rivals to the south. Suspecting the French were behind this, the Dutch helped the Mohawk against the Susquehannock. This attached the Mohawk to the Dutch, but there were problems. Located on the Hudson, the Mahican

blocked Mohawk access to Dutch traders unless tribute was paid to cross their territory.

This unhappy arrangement did not sit well with the Mohawk and periodically erupted into war. Since this affected their fur trade, the Dutch arranged a truce in 1613. Four years later, renewed fighting between the Mohawk and Mahican forced the closure of Fort Nassau near Albany until another peace was made in 1618. Meanwhile, the Dutch demand for fur had created competition for previously-shared hunting territory, and Mohawk encroachment had led to fighting and subjugation of some of the northern groups of Munsee Delaware during 1615. How long the Dutch could have "kept the lid on" this situation is questionable. The Mohawk were acting as middlemen for other Iroquois and had even greater ambitions. In 1624 the Dutch built a new post at Fort Orange which was actually closer to the Mohawk. Unfortunately, they also tried to take some of the St. Lawrence fur trade from the French by using Mahican middlemen to open trade with the Algonkin.

Trade with their enemies was too much for the Mohawk, and in 1624 they attacked the Mahican in a war the Dutch could not stop. Fighting continued for the next four years with the Mahican calling in their Pocumtuc and Sokoki (Western [Abenaki](#)) allies. The Dutch at first tended to favor the Mahican. Dutch soldiers from Fort Orange joined a Mahican war party in 1626. A Mohawk ambush resulted in several dead Dutchmen, but rather than retaliate, the Dutch decided to remain neutral. By 1628 the Mohawk had defeated the Mahican and driven them east of the Hudson River. Under the terms of peace, the Mahican were forced to pay tribute in wampum, or at least share their profits from wampum trade with the Delaware on Long Island. The Dutch accepted the Mohawk victory and made them their principal ally and trading partner. The Iroquois homeland occupied a very strategic position - sitting between the Dutch in the Hudson Valley and furs of the Great Lakes. Already able to force the French to stay well north, the Iroquois were ready to try to dominate the French trade on the St. Lawrence.

The result was the Beaver Wars - 70 years of violent intertribal warfare for control of the European fur trade. Largely forgotten today, the Beaver Wars were one of the critical events in North America history. With the Mahican defeated and subject, the Mohawk in 1629 continued the war against the Mahican's Sokoki and Pennacook allies. This may have continued for some time if not for the actions of third European power, Great Britain, which had begun colonizing New England in 1620. During a war in Europe between Britain and France, English privateers under Sir David Kirke captured Quebec in 1629. Without French support, the Algonkin and Montagnais were vulnerable, and after concluding a truce with the Sokoki, the Mohawk took advantage by destroying the Algonkin-Montagnais village at Trois Rivières. By late 1630 the Algonkin and Montagnais desperately needed help against the Mohawk. For three long years none came until the Treaty of St. Germaine en Laye restored Quebec to France in 1632.

By the time the French returned to the St. Lawrence that year, the Iroquois (with uninterrupted trade with the Dutch) had reversed their earlier losses


and were dangerously close to gaining control of the upper St. Lawrence and southern Ontario. The Iroquois had exhausted most of the beaver in their homeland (they never had that many to begin with). If they were to continue trade for the European goods on which they become dependent, they desperately needed to find new hunting territory. As large Iroquois war parties ranged freely through southern Ontario and the Ottawa Valley, the French tried to restore the balance of power in the region by selling firearms to their trading partners for "hunting." For obvious reasons, the Europeans at first had avoided trading firearms to the natives, although they were pretty free with steel knives and hatchets. With growing competition in the fur trade, however, their reluctance rapidly gave way.



Initially, the French took the precaution of restricting guns to Christian converts and limiting the amount of ammunition to preclude any use against themselves. Even a limited supply was sufficient at the time to allow the Huron, Algonkin, and Montagnais to counter the Iroquois, while the French rebuilt their fur trade. The firearms and steel weapons, however, soon found their way into the hands of the tribes for which the Huron acted as a middleman, and as the number of beaver dwindled in the eastern Great Lakes, Neutral, Tionontati, and Ottawa warriors used them to seize territory from Algonquin and Siouan tribes in lower Michigan and the Ohio Valley. The Beaver Wars spread westward during the 1630s and 40s. The Iroquois were Dutch allies. Because of this and past hostility, the French continued to avoid them. Despite a limited trade agreement concluded with the Mohawk in 1627, they concentrated their efforts on trade with the Huron who had strong trading ties to the western Great Lakes.

Stymied by Huron military power, the Iroquois wanted their permission to hunt in the prime beaver territory to the north and west of their homeland so they could maintain their trade with the Dutch. At the very least, the Iroquois needed the Huron to cooperate and trade some of their furs with them - something the two rival confederations had done for many years before arrival of the French and Dutch. Resorting to diplomacy, the League sent its requests to the Huron council. The Huron, however, sensed their growing advantage and refused. After the Huron killed an Iroquois hunting party in disputed territory, all-out war erupted. Although the Huron and their allies outnumbered them more than two to one, Iroquois war parties moved into southern Ontario trying to cut the Huron link through the

Ottawa Valley to French traders at Quebec. Some French settlements along the St. Lawrence were also attacked in 1633, but these were never the main target. For the most part, the Iroquois shrewdly tried to keep the French neutral, while they eliminated their native allies.



A peace arranged with Algonkin in 1634 failed almost immediately when the Algonkin renewed efforts to open trade with the Dutch in the Hudson Valley. Two separate Iroquois offensives during 1636 and 1637 drove the Algonkin deep into the upper Ottawa Valley and forced the Montagnais to retreat east towards Quebec. Smallpox from New England in 1634 slowed the Mohawk offensive, but the Seneca inflicted a major defeat on the Huron the following year. Between 1637 and 1641, the Huron paid a horrendous price for European contact and fur trade when a series of epidemics swept through their villages. When these ended, the Huron had lost many experienced leaders and almost half their population which seriously weakened their ability to defend themselves against the Iroquois. When the French had begun to provide firearms to the Huron and Algonkin, the Dutch had kept pace in supplying them to the Iroquois. The resulting arms race had remained on a relatively low level until the Swedes established a colony on the lower Delaware River in 1638.


To compensate for their late start in the fur trade, the Swedes placed few restrictions on the amount of firearms they sold to the Susquehannock. Suddenly confronted by a well-armed enemy to the south in Pennsylvania, the Iroquois turned to the Dutch for more and better firearms. Already angry the Swedes had settled on territory claimed by themselves and taken over their trade, the Dutch provided additional guns and ammunition and in the process gave the Iroquois a definite arms advantage over the Huron. The first victim of this new armament was not the Huron, but the small Iroquian-speaking [Wenro](#) tribe of western New York. Abandoned by their Erie and Neutral allies, they were overrun by the Iroquois in 1639. Resistance continued until 1643, but the surviving Wenro were finally forced to seek refuge with the Huron and Neutrals. The major change came in 1640, when the other newcomers to the fur trade, New England traders from Boston, tried to break the Dutch trade monopoly with the Mohawk by selling them firearms.

Although this sale would have violated British law, the Dutch started selling the Iroquois all the guns and powder they wanted. The level of violence in the Beaver Wars escalated dramatically, with the Iroquois, now even better armed than the French, holding a clear advantage in firepower. Despite this the Huron won two major victories against the Iroquois in 1640 and 1641. but within a year, the Mohawk and Oneida had driven the last groups of Algonkin and Montagnais from the upper St. Lawrence. The French responded by building forts, but these proved inadequate to protect even their own settlements which were coming under attack. The founding of Montreal at the mouth of the Ottawa River in 1642 shortened the distance the Huron had to travel to trade, but the French were vulnerable to attack in this new location. The Iroquois easily compensated during 1642 and 1643 by moving large war parties into the Ottawa Valley to attack the French and Huron trying to move furs to Montreal.

As if the French did not have enough trouble, a long-standing hostility between the Montagnais and Sokoki (Western Abenaki) had erupted into war in 1642 when the Montagnais attempted to keep the Sokoki from trading directly with the French at Quebec. Since the Mohawk were already at war with the Montagnais, the Sokoki put aside past differences and formed an alliance with the Mohawk. This also brought the Mahican (Mohawk allies since 1628) into the fighting, and in 1645 a combined Mohawk, Sokoki, and Mahican war party raided the main Montagnais village near Sillery, Quebec. The Dutch in 1640 had also begun providing large quantities of firearms to the Mahican. By 1642 both the Mohawk and Mahican were using these weapons to demand tribute from the Munsee and Wappinger Delaware on the lower Hudson. To escape this harassment, the Wiechquaeskeck (Wappinger) moved south during the winter of 1642-43 to Manhattan Island and the Tappan and Hackensack villages at Pavonia (Jersey City) for what they thought was the protection of the Dutch settlements.

The Dutch, however, became alarmed and in February, 1643 made a surprise attack on the Wiechquaeskeck village killing more than 100 of them. The Pavonia Massacre ignited the Wappinger War (Governor Kieft's War) (1643-45). The fighting spread to include Munsee in New Jersey and

Unami (Delaware) and Metoac of western Long Island, and the Dutch were forced to call upon the Mahican and Mohawk for help. After signing a formal treaty of alliance with the Dutch that year, the Mohawk and Mahican set to work. By the time a peace was finally signed at Fort Orange in the summer of 1645, more than 1,600 Wappinger, Munsee, and Metoac had been killed, and the Mohawk and Mahican had gained control of the wampum trade of western Long Island. Munsee resentment continued to smolder during the final 20 years of Dutch rule, but the Mohawk stood ready to crush an uprising. Violence finally came when five Munsee tribes combined to fight the new Dutch settlements in the Esopus Valley. The Mohawk attacked the Munsee villages killing hundreds, and when the Esopus War (1660-64) ended, the Munsee had been conquered and made subject to the Iroquois.



For the French, 1644 was an especially grim year. The Atontrataronnon (Algonkin) were driven from the Ottawa River and forced to seek refuge with the Huron, and three large Huron canoe flotillas transporting fur to Montreal were captured by the Iroquois. The fur trade on the St. Lawrence

had come to almost a complete halt, so the French were ready to listen when the Iroquois proposed a truce. The peace treaty signed in 1645 allowed the French to resume the fur trade, and the Mohawk, who had suffered heavy losses from war and epidemic, got the release of their warriors being held prisoner by the French. However, the treaty failed to solve the main cause of the war. The Iroquois expected peace would bring a resumption of their earlier trade with the Huron. Instead, the Huron ignored Iroquois overtures for trade and sent 60 canoe-loads of fur to Montreal in 1645 followed by 80 loads in 1646. After two years of increasingly-strained diplomacy failed to change this, all hell broke loose.

While their diplomats took great care to reassure the French and keep them neutral, the Iroquois destroyed the Arendaronon Huron villages in 1647 and cut the trade route to Montreal. Very few furs got through that year. In 1648 a massive 250-man Huron canoe flotilla fought its way past the Iroquois blockade on the Ottawa River and reached Quebec, but during their absence, the Iroquois destroyed the Huron mission-village of St. Joseph torturing and killing its Jesuit missionary. This scattered the Attigneenongnahac Huron. Sensing a complete Iroquois victory, the Dutch provided 400 high-quality flintlocks and unlimited ammunition on credit. The final blow came during two days in March, 1649. In coordinated attacks, 2,000 Mohawk and Seneca warriors stuck the Huron mission-villages of St. Ignace and St. Louis. Hundreds of Huron were killed or captured, while two more French Jesuits were tortured to death. Huron resistance abruptly collapsed, and the survivors scattered and fled to be destroyed or captured.

The Iroquois, however, were not about to just let the Huron go. After 20 years of war and epidemic, they had paid a high price for victory. Down to less than 1,000 warriors, the League had decided on massive adoptions to refill their ranks. The "Great Pursuit" began the following December when the Iroquois went after the Attignawantan Huron who had taken refuge with the Tionontati. The main Tionontati village was overrun, and less than 1,000 Tionontati and Huron managed to escape to a temporary refuge on Mackinac Island near Sault Ste. Marie (Upper Michigan). The Iroquois followed, and by 1651 the Huron and Tionontati refugees (who together would become the Wyandot) were forced to relocate farther west to Green Bay, Wisconsin. The following spring the Nipissing suffered the same fate (survivors fled north to the Ojibwe), and the last groups of Algonkin abandoned the upper Ottawa Valley and disappeared into safety of the northern forests with the Cree for the next twenty years.

Meanwhile, the Tahonaenrat Huron had moved southwest among the villages of the Neutrals. Throughout the many wars between Iroquois and Huron, the Neutrals had refused to take sides. Huron and Iroquois war parties passed through their homeland to attack each other, but the Neutrals remained neutral - hence their name. Perhaps alarmed by the sudden Iroquois victory over the Huron, they made no effort to prevent the Tahonaenrat from continuing to make war on the Iroquois. After not-so-diplomatic requests for the Neutrals to surrender their "guests" were ignored, the Iroquois attacked them in 1650. For the first year of the war, the Neutrals had the support of the Susquehannock who had been Huron

allies before 1648. However, this ended in 1651 when the Mohawk and Oneida attacked the Susquehanna. The main Neutral fort of Kinuka fell to the Seneca that year, and the other Neutrals either surrendered or were overrun.

The Tahonaenrat surrendered enmass and were incorporated into the Seneca, but large groups of Neutrals and Huron fled south to the Erie. Their reception was less than cordial, but they were allowed to stay in a status of semi-slavery. The "Great Pursuit" continued, and the Iroquois demanded the Erie turn the refugees over to them. Relations between the Iroquois and Erie apparently had never been friendly, and reinforced with hundreds of new warriors, the Erie flatly refused. The matter simmered for two years with growing violence. In 1653 an Erie raid into the Iroquois homeland killed a Seneca sachem. A last minute conference was held to avoid war, but in the course of a heated argument, an Erie warrior murdered an Onondaga, and Iroquois retaliated by killing all 30 of the Erie representatives. After this, peace was impossible, and the western Iroquois prepared for war. However, having great respect for the Erie as warriors, they first took the precaution of arranging a peace with the French.

When the Huron were overrun in 1649, the French fur trade empire collapsed. The Jesuits had been killed, their native trading partners and allies destroyed or scattered, and the flow of fur stopped. The French still encouraged the natives to come to Montreal for trade, but very few tried with the Iroquois controlling the Ottawa River. The offer of peace did not include the Mohawk and Oneida, but the French grabbed at a chance to end hostilities with the other three Iroquois tribes. With the French pacified and the Mohawk and Oneida keeping the only possible ally, the Susquehannock, from giving any aid, the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga were free to deal with the Erie. Their initial caution proved justified. Without firearms, the Erie held out for three years until resistance ended in 1656. The survivors were incorporated into the Iroquois.

At this point, no power in North America could have stood against the Iroquois League, even the Europeans. However, rather than choosing to confront the Europeans, the Iroquois decided to deal with them as equals and use their firearms and trade goods to their own advantage. To this end, it should be noted the Iroquois never tried to eliminate one European power for the benefit of another. Instead, they attempted to maintain a working relationship with each one, even the French. Rather than being a Dutch ally, the Iroquois were in business for themselves to dominate the fur trade with the Europeans and set about creating an empire for this purpose. Details of how they did this have been mostly lost, since no European was present to record what happened. Oral traditions provide only partial answers, but archeological evidence indicates the western Great Lakes and Ohio Valley were rather heavily populated before contact. The first French explorers in the area during the 1660s and 70s, however, found few residents and many refugees.

It is also unclear how much warfare by the Huron, Neutrals, Ottawa, Erie and Susquehannock in pursuit of beaver fur prepared the way for the Iroquois conquest of the Great Lakes and Ohio Valley, but in only ten years,

the western Iroquois cleared the region of most of its remaining native inhabitants. By 1667, the following tribes had been forced to relocate from their original locations:

1. The Potawatomi, Fox, Sauk, and Mascouten had left lower Michigan and were living in mixed refugee villages in Wisconsin.
2. The Shawnee, [Kickapoo](#), and part of the [Miami](#) had been forced from Ohio and Indiana. The Kickapoo and Miami moved to Wisconsin, but the [Shawnee](#) scattered to Tennessee, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and South Carolina.
3. Attacked by the Seneca in 1655 for giving refuge to Huron and Neutrals, the Illinois were forced west of the Mississippi River. They returned later but went no further than the Illinois River Valley which was well to the west of their original territory.
4. The Dhegiha Sioux (Osage, Kansa, Ponca, Omaha, and Quapaw) abandoned the lower Wabash Valley and moved west to the Missouri River. The Quapaw, however, separated from the others, went south, and settled at the mouth of the Arkansas.
5. The Huron, Tionontati, Wenro, Neutrals, and Erie had been defeated and absorbed into the Iroquois. Approximately 1,000 Huron and Tionontati who escaped capture moved first to Wisconsin, then inland to the Mississippi in Minnesota, and finally to the south shore of Lake Superior.
6. The Ottawa had left their original location on the islands of Lake Huron and moved west to upper Michigan. The Nipissing and southern bands of the Ojibwe had also been forced north to the vicinity of Sault Ste. Marie.
7. Some tribes in the Ohio Valley just disappeared and are known only by name: Casa, Cisca, Iskousogom, Moneton, Mospelea, Ouabano, Teochanontian, Tomahitan, and Tramontane. Who they were and exactly what happened to them is unknown.

While the western Iroquois were conquering the Ohio Valley, the Mohawk and Oneida were busy in the east. In 1647 their war with the Algonkin and Montagnais had spread to the Abenaki in Maine who were helping the Montagnais.

The Mohawk's alliance with the Sokoki against the Montagnais ended with fighting over hunting territory east of Lake Champlain. The sudden collapse of the Huron in 1649 had alarmed everyone, and the French at Quebec tried to assemble whatever allies they could against the Iroquois. The Mohawk struck outlying French settlements and kept attacking the small group of Christian Huron living just outside the gates of Quebec. In 1650 the French sent a Montagnais sachem and Jesuit missionary into northern New England to encourage an alliance between the Sokoki, Pennacook, Pocumtuc, and Mahican against the Iroquois. The New England colonies were also asked to participate, but the British were not interested. The French got the alliance they were seeking and began providing firearms to its members. Despite

occasional raids against the Sokoki in Vermont, the alliance was not tested initially. The Mohawk after 1651 had all they could handle in their war in Pennsylvania with the Susquehannock.



The Susquehannock had always been formidable warriors. In 1651 they had been well-armed by Swedish traders from the lower Delaware River. After four years of fighting with heavy losses to both sides, the Mohawk and Oneida only succeeded in capturing part of the upper part of Susquehanna River. The war was a stalemate, until the Dutch took the Swedish colonies in 1655. Suddenly deprived of their source of weapons, the Susquehannock asked for peace. The Mohawk readily agreed. Peace with the Susquehannock freed the Mohawk and Oneida to turn on their enemies in western New England, and the alliance received its first test. New fighting between the Mohawk and Mahican concerned the Dutch, and at their insistence, the Mahican left the alliance in 1658 and made peace with the Mohawk. However, the Mohawk soon discovered the Mahican were arranging trade between the Dutch and the Montagnais and Sokoki. Diplomacy failed to stop this, and in 1662 the Mohawk attacked the Mahican. Two years of war forced the Mahican to abandon most of the Hudson Valley, including their capital at Shodac near Albany.

Supplied by both French and British, the Sokoki, [Pennacook](#), Pocumtuc, and Montagnais continued fighting the Mohawk and were holding their own.

Iroquois and Algonquin war parties moved back-and-forth across western New England attacking each other's villages. By 1660 the war had spread to include the Abenaki in Maine who were allies of the Montagnais. After an attack against a Mohawk village failed in 1663, the Pocumtuc found they were running out of warriors and asked the Dutch to arrange a truce. Nothing came of this, and in December a large Mohawk and Seneca war party struck the main Pocumtuc village at Fort Hill (Deerfield, Massachusetts). The assault was repulsed with the loss of almost 300 warriors, but the battered Pocumtuc abandoned Fort Hill in the spring and sued for peace. The Mohawk agreed, but someone (not the Pocumtuc) murdered the Iroquois ambassadors enroute to the peace conference. The Mohawk renewed their attacks forcing the Pocumtuc from the middle Connecticut River.

In the midst of this, the British seized New York in 1664. The Dutch recaptured it in 1673, but it was returned to the British by the Treaty of Westminster the following year. The important role of the Dutch in North America ended at this point. The British concluded their own treaty of friendship with the Mohawk in 1664 and, most importantly, left the Dutch traders at Albany in charge of the trade essential to the Iroquois war machine. British traders at Boston saw greater opportunity trading with the powerful Iroquois than New England Algonquin and moved west to Albany. Their departure left the Sokoki, Abenaki, and Pennacook without support other than the French. No longer concerned about getting into a war with the British, the Mohawk took advantage and began to drive the Sokoki and Pennacook from the upper Connecticut River, one raid even reaching the vicinity of Boston in 1665.

The French had noted the British capture of New York and their subsequent treaty with the Mohawk. Worried the British would gain control of the fur trade and tired of being threatened by the Iroquois, the French Crown took formal possession of New France and in June, 1665 sent the 1,200-man Carignan-Salières regiment to Canada. The French soldiers had much to learn, and their first offensive against the Iroquois got lost in the woods. However, during the winter of 1665-66, they invaded the Iroquois homeland with devastating effect and burned the Mohawk villages of Tionnontoguen and Kanagaro. By the following spring the Mohawk were asking the English for help. The governor of New York (also concerned about French) agreed to an alliance but only on condition the Mohawk first make peace with Mahican and Sokoki. The Mahican were ready, but the Sokoki refused. That summer, the Mohawk struck the Pennacook, while the Sokoki and Kennebec attacked Mohawk villages.

The French army resumed their attacks in the fall but ran into a Mohawk ambush. The attacks still had their effect, and the Iroquois agreed to a general peace with the French in 1667. This freed the western Iroquois to concentrate on the still-dangerous Susquehannock while the Mohawk went after western New England. During 1668 the Mohawk drove the Pennacook across New Hampshire to the protection of the Abenaki in Maine. The following year an alliance of New England Algonquin (including Sokoki and Mahican) retaliated, but the attack on a Mohawk village was ambushed on their return home. With the exception of Missisquoi on the north end of

Lake Champlain, by the time peace was arranged in 1670, most Sokoki were living under French protection along the St. Lawrence. The peace the Mahican agreed to in 1672 with the Iroquois was actually surrender. Afterwards, the Iroquois handled all Mahican relations with Europeans. In 1677 the Mahican became the first member of the Covenant Chain.



The alliance of the British and Iroquois served to protect both from the French. It also gave the Iroquois the support of the British in extending its authority over other tribes by gathering them into the Covenant Chain

which greatly increased the League's power and influence. There were several advantages for the British: it kept the Covenant Chain tribes from falling under French influence; negotiations with Native Americans were simplified since the British only had to deal with the Iroquois; and it also allowed the British to call upon the League a "policeman" in case of trouble. When the Wampanoag tried to use the Mahican village at Schaghticoke as a refuge during the King Philip's War (1675-76), the governor of New York called on the Mohawk to force them back to Massachusetts. The Mohawk later helped New England force Philip's Sokoki and Pennacook allies to retreat into northern Maine and Canada. Unfortunately, this also drove these peoples into an alliance with the French.

After destroying the Erie in 1656, the western Iroquois had turned on the Algonquin in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes and driven them west of Lake Michigan. The peace the French had signed with the western Iroquois in 1653, had not given the French access to the western Great Lakes and left them besieged in Montreal and Quebec by the Mohawk and Oneida. What little fur reached them came from the Ottawa who, after the destruction of the Huron, had assumed the middleman's role in trade with the French. This eventually annoyed the Iroquois, and they attacked the Ottawa living on the islands of Lake Huron forcing them west to Wisconsin and upper Michigan. The only French to visit the western Great Lakes during this period were Radisson and Groseilliers who reached the west end of Lake Superior in 1658 (only to be arrested when they returned to Quebec for trading without a license). The French peace with the Iroquois came to an end in 1658 with the murder of a Jesuit ambassador, and it was not until 1665 that Nicolas Perot and Father Claude-Jean Allouez (6 French and 400 Huron, Ottawa, and Ojibwe) fought their way up the Ottawa River and made their way to Green Bay.

What they found was appalling. More than 30,000 refugees (Fox, Sauk, Ottawa, Mascouten, Miami, Kickapoo, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi) had overwhelmed both the resident Winnebago and Menominee and the resources of the area. Too far north for growing corn, the area was over-hunted, and the starving refugees were fighting among themselves over the little that was left. War had also started with the Dakota (Sioux) to the west as Algonquin hunters encroached on their territory. The refugees were also subject to periodic attacks by the Iroquois whose "Great Pursuit" had followed the Wyandot to Wisconsin. In 1653 the Seneca had attacked a Wyandot and Potawatomi fort near Green Bay, but the Iroquois were forced to withdraw after they ran out of food. The [Wyandot](#) retreated inland to the Mississippi and finally to the south shore of Superior. However, the Iroquois continued to strike without warning. A Fox village had been destroyed in 1657, although in 1662 the Ojibwe, Ottawa, and Nipissing surprised and annihilated a large Mohawk and Oneida war party at Iroquois Point (east end of Lake Superior).

The peace signed between the French and Iroquois in 1667 was significant. It not only included all five members of the Iroquois League but extended to French allies and trading partners in the western Great Lakes. The relentless Iroquois pursuit of the Wyandot ended, and the French were able to rebuild their fur trade. French traders and Jesuit missionaries

immediately went west and began to bring some order to the chaos in Wisconsin. The French were also able to explore the Ohio Valley for the first time in 1669 which provided the basis for their later claim to the area. The Iroquois, of course, already claimed it by right of conquest. Marquette and Joliet reached the Mississippi in 1673, and LaSalle claimed Louisiana for France in 1682. More importantly, as fur began to reach the markets at Montreal and Quebec once again, the French became the mediator in intertribal disputes - the first step towards organized Algonquin resistance to the Iroquois.



While the French used the peace to rebuild, the British became increasingly concerned with French military power and expansion. When they began to increase their own military strength, the stage was set for the 100-year struggle between Britain and France for control of North America. For the Iroquois, the events of 1664-67 changed the manner in which the League functioned. By 1677 the Iroquois had signed their first treaties as the "Five Nations," and members afterwards rarely negotiated separate treaties or conducted their own wars. Relations with European powers grew more complex, and the League found it necessary to first resolve its internal differences in order to present a united front to outsiders. The peace signed with the French in 1667 also had advantages for the Iroquois. They settled in the old Huron homeland of southern Ontario - uninhabited since 1650. While men had fought each other, the beaver were at peace, and the area had recovered to once again become a prime fur area.

It also freed the western Iroquois for a war with the one Iroquoian-speaking neighbor who had remained independent of the League. The Susquehannock's long war against the Mohawk and Oneida had barely ended in 1655, when a new conflict began with the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga. The western Iroquois found them just as stubborn as had the Mohawk. Outnumbered three-to-one, the Susquehannock enlisted support from their tributary Algonquin and Siouan tribes (Shawnee, Delaware, Nanticoke, Conoy, Saponi, and Tutelo), and although they had lost the Swedes in 1655, alliances with Maryland colonists in 1661 and 1666 provided the necessary weapons. The Mohawk had their own wars in the tribes in New England and continued to honor their peace with the Susquehannock. The Mohawk, however, helped the Dutch during the Esopus War and, in crushing the Munsee Delaware, deprived the Susquehannock of one of their allies in 1664.

The Susquehannock concentrated in a single impregnable fort for defense, so the Iroquois went after their allies and attacked the Delaware living along the Delaware River during the 1660s. The Shawnee also came under attack and were scattered. The pursuit of these Susquehannock allies south into South Carolina and Tennessee soon had Iroquois war parties fighting with Cherokee and Catawba. In the end the Susquehannock were just too few. The greatest blow, however, was not military defeat but epidemic when smallpox struck their single, crowded village with devastating effect in 1661. When the western Iroquois were free to prosecute the war with their full strength in 1668, the Susquehannock had only 300 warriors. Still, they continued to fight for another seven years, and it was not until 1675 that the Iroquois were finally able to force their surrender.

The first phase of the Beaver Wars ended with the Iroquois conquest of the Susquehannock. During the next ten years, the Iroquois finished off the last of their Nanticoke and Conoy allies and incorporated them into the Covenant Chain. Maryland made peace with the League in 1682, but raids (which had begun in 1671) against the Saponi and Tutelo in Virginia and the Catawba in South Carolina continued. Iroquois power reached its peak in 1680. By this time they had won a vast empire, and their warriors had fought battles in every state east of the Mississippi. They never crossed this river, but the Iroquois already knew trails leading to South Dakota's Black

Hills. After their war with the Susquehannock, the Iroquois turned their attention west again, but were unhappy with what they saw. With peace in the region after 1667, the French fur trade was going well, and the Algonquin had, for the most part, stopped fighting each other.



It had not been a perfect peace - the Seneca had attacked Mackinac in 1671 and the Dakota were fighting the Ojibwe and Fox along the shores of Superior, but it was a major improvement over the chaos the French had discovered in 1665. In 1680 Robert LaSalle had opened Fort Crèvecoeur on the upper Illinois River to trade with the tribes of the Illinois Confederation, and thousands of Algonquin had gathered in the vicinity. This many


potential enemies bothered the Iroquois, but of greater concern were Illinois hunters moving into Ohio, Indiana and lower Michigan (claimed by the Iroquois) and taking every beaver they could. Since this included the young beaver, there was no breeding stock to replace the ones killed. Iroquois protests resulted in the murder of a Seneca sachem by the Illinois at an Ottawa village beginning the second phase of the Beaver Wars in 1680.

Back in western New York, the Seneca formed an enormous war party and started west to teach the Illinois a lesson they would never forget. Enroute they added warriors from the Miami (Illinois enemies) and set out for the Illinois villages near Fort Crèvecoeur. Warned of their approach, the French evacuated their trading post and left for Wisconsin. Most of the Illinois also moved to safety west of the Mississippi, but the Tamora, Espeminkia, and Maroa chose to remain - a fatal mistake. After the Seneca had finished their deadly work, the French returned to find the valley littered with bodies and burned villages. Thousands of Illinois had been massacred. Only a few Tamora and Maroa survived, and the Espeminkia disappeared completely. The Seneca returned in 1681, but Henri Tonti built Fort St. Louis on the upper Illinois during 1682, and the new stronghold brought the Illinois back from west of the Mississippi. Meanwhile, the Miami had allowed Shawnee (Iroquois enemies) to settle in their midst. Threatened by the Iroquois over this, they switched sides and allowed the French to arrange a peace with Illinois allowing the Miami to move closer to the French fort.

By 1684 the native population near Fort St. Louis had grown to more than 20,000. The Iroquois returned in force that year, but the Algonquin stood and fought. The Iroquois siege failed to capture the fort, and they were forced to retreat - the turning point of the Beaver Wars. Elated by this victory, the French began to organize a formal alliance against the Iroquois. The first offensive failed so miserably, that Joseph La Barre, the French governor of Canada, panicked and signed a treaty with the Iroquois ceding most of Illinois. La Barre was replaced by Jacques-Rene Denonville who renounced the treaty, built new forts, strengthened old ones, and provided guns to the Great Lakes Algonquin. The strengthened alliance (Ojibwe, Ottawa, Wyandot, Potawatomi, Mississauga, Fox, Sauk, Miami, Winnebago, Menominee, Kickapoo, Illinois, and Mascouten) took the offensive in 1687. Following important alliance victories in massive battles fought between canoe fleets on Lake St. Clair and Erie, the Iroquois were clearly on the defensive by the 1690s and falling back across the Great Lakes towards New York. By 1696 the Iroquois had been forced to abandon most of their southern Ontario villages to the Mississauga (Ojibwe) and, except for eastern Ohio and northern Pennsylvania, had retreated to their homeland.

The last part of the Beaver Wars coincided with King William's War (1688-97) between Britain and France. This meant warfare was not confined just to the Great Lakes, and in 1687 the French had struck the Seneca and Onondaga villages in the Iroquois homeland. More than 1,200 Iroquois warriors retaliated in August, 1689 with a massive raid against Lachine just outside Montreal which killed more than two hundred French settlers. The following year the French and their allies attacked Schenectady. The Mohawk attacked the Sokoki at St. Francois (the main French ally in the east) in 1690 and 1692, but three separate campaigns launched from

Quebec by Louis Frontenac 1693-96 carried the war to the Iroquois villages. Under intense pressure from both the east and west, smallpox broke out among the Iroquois in 1690. The Iroquois made overtures for a separate peace to the French in 1694, but these were ignored because the offer did not include French allies.



The Treaty of Ryswick, which ended the war between Britain and France in 1697, placed the League under British protection (not something the Iroquois had requested). The French worried their continuing war with the Iroquois might bring another confrontation with the British and began to consider the Iroquois peace offers with greater interest. However, their first attempts to urge a settlement on their allies created suspicion that they would abandon their allies and make a separate peace. There was good reason for the Algonquin to feel this way since the Iroquois had already attempted to break the alliance with offers of peace and trade to the Ottawa and Wyandot. The main problem was the return of prisoners taken and adopted by the Iroquois. Sensing the League was about to collapse, the Algonquin wanted total victory, and the fighting continued until 1701.

The peace signed with the Iroquois that year included both the French and their allies. The French agreed to mediate any disputes which might arise between the League and Algonquin, while the Iroquois promised to remain neutral in any future war between Britain and France. That future war would start that very year - Queen Anne's War (1701-13). In their hurry to insure Iroquois neutrality before the outbreak of hostilities, the French neglected to extinguish Iroquois claims to the Ohio Valley in favor of their own, and the British would soon claim this area since the Iroquois were supposedly under their protection. For the most part, the Iroquois had been a British ally during the King William's War, but only to the extent they were engaged in a separate war with the French. Fighting during the Queen Anne's War was mostly in New England and Canadian Maritimes, and keeping its word, the League remained neutral and waited to see who won.

Not everything was peaceful, however. The powerful Mississauga expanded south along the shores of Lake Huron into southern Ontario and seized territory from the Iroquois. Concerned with other matters, the French ignored the League's protests about this, and by 1713 the Iroquois were considering an invasion of Canada. Fortunately, the Queen Anne's War ended with the Treaty of Utrecht that year, and the French finally got around to mediating a settlement. This dispute, however, was one of the least of their problems. France had emerged from the King William's War as the winner in North America. It then proceeded to discard the fruits of its victory. A glut of beaver fur in Europe had caused a drastic drop in price, and the French monarchy suddenly "got religion." For years, the Jesuits had been protesting the destruction which the fur trade was causing among Native Americans, but no one listened until a drop in price made fur unprofitable.

A royal proclamation was issued curtailing fur trade in the western Great Lakes. Realizing the disaster this was for the Algonquin alliance, Frontenac, the governor of Canada, delayed implementation to such extent he was removed. His successor obediently closed forts and trading posts, and the French surrendered their main source of power and influence - trade goods and presents. Their hard-won alliance in the Great Lakes quickly began to unravel. The Iroquois may have been down in 1701, but certainly not out, and they immediately sensed the French dilemma. Still controlling access to British and Dutch traders at Albany, they proceeded, after military force had failed them, to attack the French with trade. Even before the peace was signed in 1701, the Iroquois had used trade with the British as a weapon to break the unity of the alliance. When the French finally put the proclamation into effect, Iroquois traders went to work.

The French responded in 1701 to this challenge from the "neutral" Iroquois with a new post at Detroit, Fort Pontchartrain. Just about every tribe in the French alliance immediately moved nearby, and the resulting frictions placed further strains on the alliance. The French lost control, and the tense situation exploded in 1712 when the Fox attacked Fort Pontchartrain. The Fox Wars (1712-16 and 1728-37) marked a period of intertribal warfare between members of the French alliance. Living under the "Great Peace," the Iroquois must have enjoyed the spectacle of their enemies fighting among themselves. They continued to make inroads into the French trade

empire with British trade goods which were not only of higher quality than the French, but lower in price. The Ottawa began to trade with the Iroquois and British in 1717, and other French allies followed. By the time the French rescinded the royal decree, it was too late. The Iroquois allowed the British in 1727 to build Fort Oswego in their homeland to shorten the travel distance for the Great Lakes tribes. By 1728, 80% of the beaver on the Albany market was coming from French allies.



The British accepted Iroquois neutrality after 1701 but still found them useful as a buffer between themselves and French Canada. With the French alliance in disarray, the Iroquois soon realized they represented the balance of power between the British and French in North America. By taking advantage of this fact until the final French defeat in 1763, they managed to maintain their power and independence. A remarkable achievement, and the diplomatic skills they demonstrated were at least the equal of any European statesman. While they weakened the French with economic warfare, the Iroquois used British fear of French influence among Native Americans in the British colonies to gain support for the Covenant Chain. The British government actually pushed these tribes into joining, and membership eventually included (at different times): Shawnee, Miami, Delaware, Conestoga (Susquehannock), Nanticoke, Saponi, Tutelo, Munsee, Mahican, Conoy (Piscataway), [Cherokee](#), Creek, Choctaw, [Catawba](#), and Chickasaw.

The League's actual power to speak for some tribes was far from absolute. No amount of threat and intimidation could force the Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, Catawba, or Choctaw to submit to the League's authority, and Iroquois attempts to enforce their will often led to warfare. Perhaps the Covenant Chain's worst feature was the Iroquois often placed their own (or

British) interests ahead of tribes they were supposed to represent. An exception was the Iroquois threat of intervention on behalf of the Tuscarora during the Tuscarora War (1712-13) with the Carolina colonists. The Iroquois stopped short of a war but remained defiant. In 1714 they allowed the Iroquoian-speaking Tuscarora to join them in western New York, and for years afterwards Iroquois war parties went south to punish the Catawba for helping the British against the Tuscarora. By 1722 the Tuscarora had become the sixth, but non-voting, member of the Iroquois League. Four years later, the Iroquois began to secretly organize a massive uprising by all tribes east of the Mississippi against the French and British. The response from other tribes, however, was mostly negative, and the idea was dropped.



The political unity of the Iroquois was the source of their power, but it was by no means perfect. Divisions appeared over religion after French Jesuit missionaries began to make regular visits to Iroquois villages during the 1640s. This proved to be very dangerous work for the "blackrobes". Suspicion of French in general and smallpox in particular frequently caused the Iroquois to protect themselves from what they perceived as witchcraft, with fatal results for the priest. However, the Jesuits kept coming and

began to make converts. The mission of St. Marie was established at the Mohawk village of Teatontaloga in 1642 but was destroyed three years later during an epidemic. Father Jogues was warned to stay away, but he attempted to rebuild the mission and was murdered in 1643. Despite this, missionary work resumed among the Mohawk, but it was the League's incorporation of large numbers of Christian Huron, Tionontati, and Neutrals during the 1650s which really opened the door for the Jesuits.

Through the efforts of Father Le Moine, Notre Dame de Ganentaa, the first mission among the Onondaga was opened in 1654. Two years later Father René Ménard built Etienne for the Cayuga, and separate missions were also established for the Seneca and Oneida in 1656. As the number of converts rose, there was increasing conflict between traditional and Christian Iroquois. Meanwhile, the French had signed a peace with the western Iroquois but still avoided trade with them, preferring to get their furs from the Ottawa. As tensions increased, the French tried using Jesuits as go-betweens in dealings with the League. This made the Jesuits appear partisan to the Iroquois, and following the murder in 1658 of a Jesuit serving as a French ambassador, peace between the French and Iroquois ended. Most of the missions were abandoned temporarily. With renewed hostilities, the Iroquois began to question the loyalty of Christian tribesmen pressuring them to renounce their new religion and return to traditional Iroquois ways. Many did, but others were forced from the Iroquois villages. Eventually, many left entirely and settled near the French in the St. Lawrence Valley.

The first of these settlements was at La Prairie near Montreal. In 1667 the Jesuits convinced some Christian Oneida to spend the winter. More Oneida and several Mohawk families came later, and other Christian Iroquois followed. This new Iroquois settlement grew very rapidly, but the soil at La Prairie proved unsuitable for corn. In 1673 they moved a short distance to Sault St. Louis (Lachine) calling the new village Caughnawaga. The Caughnawaga population was mixed (at one point it included Huron from Notre Dame de Foy), but the vast majority were Mohawk. By 1680 more Mohawk warriors were living near the French at Caughnawaga than in the Mohawk homeland. Although many had been forced to leave their homeland over religion, the Caughnawaga Mohawk still observed the "Great Law of Peace" and remained neutral in wars between the French and the Iroquois League. This changed with the massive Iroquois raid against the French at Lachine in 1689, after which the Caughnawaga entered the war as French allies.

During the remainder of the war, Caughnawaga warriors participated in the French retaliatory raids against Albany and Schenectady and even guided French expeditions against the Iroquois homeland. However, the "Great Peace" was still observed, and Iroquois and Caughnawaga warriors took care to avoid confrontations where they would have to kill each other. The Caughnawaga paid a high price for their support of the French in the King William's War, and by 1696 they had lost half of their warriors. The French war with the Iroquois League dragged on until 1701, but the Caughnawaga were instrumental in arranging the terms of the peace treaty signed that year. While the Iroquois League agreed to remain neutral in future wars

between Britain and France, no such restrictions were placed on the Caughnawaga. By the outbreak of the Queen Anne's War, the Caughnawaga had allied with the Abenaki, and as French allies, their joint war parties raided New England. The worst blows were in Massachusetts. Deerfield was destroyed in February, 1704 (59 killed and 109 captured), and Groton burned in 1710.



The Iroquois have often described as a British ally during the four major conflicts between Britain and France. In truth, after 1701, more Iroquois were fighting for the French than British. The League (except the Mohawk) was neutral in these conflicts, while the Caughnawaga were a major French ally. The original Caughnawaga grew so rapidly part of the population moved across the St. Lawrence in 1676 to start a second village at Kanesatake. By 1720 the Lake of the Two Mountains mission was built for the Iroquois of the Mountain who would become the modern Mohawk community of Oka. Caughnawaga was moved slightly in 1716 to its present location after soil at the old site became exhausted. Other sites were added as the number of pro-French Iroquois along the St. Lawrence continued to grow: Sault Recollet in 1721; Oswegatchie and the La Presentation mission (Ogdensburg, New York) in 1748 for the Onondaga, Oneida, and Cayuga;

and St. Regis in 1756 to relieve overcrowded conditions among the Mohawk at Caughnawaga.

Besides the defection of most of the Christian Iroquois to the French along the St. Lawrence, the League was further weakened when another portion of its population began moving to the Ohio Valley. The massive adoptions of the 1650s had actually made the original Iroquois a minority within the League, but they had retained political power since representatives to the League's council were chosen from certain "royal" families, all of which were part of the original Iroquois. For the most part, this excluded adoptees from positions of authority, and this second-class status caused dissatisfaction. Rather than outright revolt, many chose to separate themselves from the League. Groups of Iroquois hunters, mainly Seneca and Cayuga, but to a large degree descendants of adopted Huron Susquehannock, Neutrals, and Erie, began to move to Ohio and western Pennsylvania during the 1720s and establish permanent villages outside the Iroquois homeland. By the 1730s their numbers had become significant, and the British traders had started calling them by a corrupted form of their Delaware name - Mingo.

The Iroquois League made little objection to the Mingo migration so long as they continued to acknowledge its authority. Actually, it was to the League's advantage to have tribesmen living there to keep the French and their Algonquin allies from claiming the Ohio Country. The Iroquois did not object when part of the Wyandot left Detroit and settled along the Sandusky River in northwest Ohio. Instead, the Iroquois saw an opportunity to lure an important member of the Great Lakes alliance from the French and into the Covenant Chain. Within a few years, Wyandot ambassadors routinely spoke in the League's councils (a major change from the days of the "Great Pursuit") and were considered by other tribes in the area as the de facto Iroquois viceroy of Ohio. By 1740 there were almost a thousand Mingo living in western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio. Although considered part of the Iroquois, they had begun to think and act like a separate tribe.

From its peak of 25,000 in 1660, Iroquois population had gone into a steady decline from war and epidemic to about 14,000 by 1740. The 1,500 Tuscarora added in 1722 did not compensate for the defection of 1,000 Mingo to Ohio and 2,000 Caughnawaga to Canada. Both the British and French were aware of this decline, but on paper the Iroquois were still formidable because of the Covenant Chain. As mentioned, the League often abused its responsibility to represent member tribes, and there never was a clearer example than its support of the British in the infamous Walking Purchase in 1737. Pennsylvania "discovered" an old treaty supposedly signed by the Delaware which gave it the right to claim a large part of the remaining Delaware homeland. Through fraud and trickery, the colonists enlarged the claim to include almost all of the land the Delaware had left. As members of the Covenant Chain, the Delaware turned to the League for help.

What they got instead was intimidation and insult. Furious the Delaware had dared to sell land without their permission, the Iroquois took the bribes offered by Pennsylvania and supported the British. The Delaware continued to protest, but at a 1742 meeting with the Pennsylvania governor, the

Iroquois representative Canasatego silenced the Delaware sachem Nutimus as he rose to complain about the Walking Purchase, called the Delaware women, and ordered him to leave. This left the Delaware and some Shawnee landless. The Iroquois ordered them to the upper Susquehanna in north-central Pennsylvania where the League was running its own "Indian reservation" for Covenant Chain tribes displaced by British settlement. The Iroquois were generous to provide land for these tribes but self-serving to the extent it gave them additional warriors in case of war with the French. In any case, the Susquehanna was crowded and deadly from malaria which had been introduced to the area after 1700.

The Shawnee hunting parties were the first to leave for western Pennsylvania and Ohio. When the Mingo living there made no objection and even shared their villages, the Shawnee became permanent residents and invited the Delaware to join them. Between 1742 and 1749, many Delaware left the Susquehanna and moved west to form mixed villages with the Shawnee and Mingo. Once again, the League did not oppose this migration because the presence of Covenant Chain tribes in western Pennsylvania only strengthened their claim versus the French and their allies. The Wyandot soon extended an invitation for the Shawnee and Delaware to settle in Ohio, and the Mingo, as part of the Iroquois, were already living there. The "republics," or mixed Mingo-Delaware-Shawnee (Ohio tribes) villages which formed, were outside the French alliance, but what the Iroquois and British did not realize at first was that they were also outside their own control. By 1750 the "republics" had a population of 10,000 with 2,000 warriors and had become a power to be reckoned with.

Trade competition in Ohio had been building with the British gaining on the French by virtue of superior goods and lower prices. Three powers claimed the area: the Iroquois by right of conquest during the 1650s and 60s; the French by right of discovery in the 1670s; and the British since the Iroquois were placed under their protection by the Treaty of Ryswick in 1696. The key to control of the area, however, were the Ohio tribes who lived there. The French realized this and began efforts to gain their allegiance. For the most part, the Ohio tribes did not wish to become subject to anyone - French, British, or Iroquois. The French had some success using the Métis Pierre Chartier to lure some of the Shawnee to their cause as well as the Cuyahoga Mingo. This was enough, however, to alarm the British who urged the Iroquois to command the Delaware and Shawnee to return to the Susquehanna. When the League council finally agreed to this, it was stunned to discover its orders were ignored, and the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo stayed right where they were and refused to leave.

With the outbreak of the King George's War (1744-48) between Britain and France, only the Mohawk, due to the influence of the British trader, William Johnson, supported the British. The League itself chose to remain neutral which was fortunate for the British, since at the time, the Iroquois were angry with them and could easily have gone over to the French. Both Pennsylvania and Virginia had chosen to interpret the Treaty of Lancaster (1744) as an Iroquois cession of Ohio to themselves, when all the League had intended was to give permission for the British to build a trading post at the forks of the Ohio River (Pittsburgh). Pennsylvania and Virginia ignored

the League's protests and both claimed the entire region. Pennsylvania's claim was more modest and extended only to eastern Ohio, but Virginia's included the entire Ohio Valley west to the Illinois River including Kentucky and lower Michigan.



As with the Queen Anne's War, most of the fighting during the King George's War was confined to New England and the Canadian Maritimes. The Caughnawaga were not only loyal to the French but allies of the Sokoki and Abenaki. When Dummer's War (1722-26) had broken out between the eastern Abenaki and New England, it was followed shortly by a separate, but related, conflict in western New England - Grey Lock's War (1723-27). Beyond supplying weapons and refuge in Canada, the French never became directly involved, but the Caughnawaga joined the Sokoki in their raids against western New England. The British asked the Iroquois to intervene, but the League was no longer willing to be a British "policeman," mainly because of a reluctance to become involved in fighting with the Caughnawaga - a violation of the "Great Peace." They did, however, ask the Abenaki to stop and offered to mediate.

Twenty years later, the Caughnawaga - who claimed western Vermont as part of their homeland - had 250 warriors and stood by the French during the King George's War. In 1744 they formed war parties with the Sokoki and Abenaki to raid the British settlements in southern Vermont and New Hampshire. Much of the New England frontier had to be abandoned during the next four years. In August, 1746 Fort Massachusetts on Hoosac River

was captured, and almost all of the settlement on the east of the Hudson River in New York also had to be abandoned as a result. The Mohawk fought for the British, but after one of their raids struck just south of Montreal, the Caughnawaga and other Canadian Iroquois formally declared war on the British colonies in 1747. The war finally ended with the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1748.

There was little fighting in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes during the war and was limited to pro-French Shawnee and Mingo attacks on British traders. Otherwise, the French allies (Ottawa, Menominee, Winnebago, Illinois, Saukteur and Mississauga Ojibwe, Potawatomi, and Wyandot) sent their warriors east to Montreal to defend Canada against the British. Despite the lack of combat, the war was a disaster for the French in the west after the British began a naval blockade of Canada in 1745. This completely cut the supply of French trade goods, and without these, the French alliance fell apart by 1747. French traders without goods were killed, and British were quick to take advantage of the situation. By war's end, British traders had entered Ohio and were trading directly with French allies like the Wyandot and Miami.

All of which boded well for the Iroquois and British to keep the French out of Ohio and western Pennsylvania. A major concern was the refusal of the Shawnee and Delaware to obey the League's order to return to the Susquehanna. Something needed to be done about this. At the Treaty of Lancaster with the Iroquois, Shawnee and Delaware (and indirectly - Mingo) in 1748, Pennsylvania urged the Iroquois to restore the Ohio tribes to the Covenant Chain as a barrier against the French. The Iroquois created a system of half-kings - special Iroquois emissaries (usually Mingo), one for the Shawnee and one for the Delaware - to represent the Ohio tribes in the Iroquois council. This regain the allegiance of the Delaware and Shawnee to the League. When the French sent Pierre-Joseph Céloron in 1749 to expel British traders and mark the Ohio boundary with lead plates, his reception was openly hostile. Two years later, Chabert de Joncaire travelled through Ohio demanding the expulsion of British traders, and the Mingo wanted to know by what authority the French were claiming Iroquois land.

Of course, the French were not the only Europeans claiming Iroquois land in the Ohio Valley. After the 1744 Treaty of Lancaster, Virginia had chartered the Ohio Company in 1747 to begin settlement around Pittsburgh. Investors included most of the important families of Virginia, including Lawrence Washington, the older half-brother of George. Pennsylvania had similar plans, and to the Iroquois it appeared the British and French were two thieves fighting over their land. It also did not help matters that the British had reduced annual presents to the Iroquois after the King George's War. The French, however, felt they were losing Ohio and decided on drastic action. In June, 1752 the Métis Charles Langlade led a war party of 250 Ottawa and Ojibwe from Mackinac in an attack which destroyed the Miami village and British trading post of Pickawillany (Piqua, Ohio). The French allies ended trade with the British, and after apologies, rejoined the French alliance. Immediately afterwards, the French began building a line of new forts across western Pennsylvania designed to block British access to Ohio.

The Mingo, Shawnee, and Delaware had no wish to fall under French control and turned to the Iroquois to stop this. Deciding the French were an immediate threat, the Iroquois cast their lot with the British and signed the Logstown Treaty in 1752 confirming their earlier cession of Ohio at Lancaster in 1744. They also gave permission for the British to build a blockhouse at Pittsburgh. This was not even completed before French soldiers forced its surrender and burned it. In December, 1753 Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia sent 21-year-old militia major George Washington to Fort Le Boeuf to order the French to abandon their forts and leave Ohio. The French commander received Washington with perfect courtesy but refused the demand. He also warned him not to come back.

The following May Washington was sent west again with a detachment of 130 militia guided by Mingo warriors under Half-King (Tanacharisson) and Monacatoocha (Scarrooyady). His mission was to force the surrender of Fort Duquesne at the forks of the Ohio, but he never got there. Enroute they got into a fight with 50 French soldiers commanded by Joseph Villier de Jumonville. Jumonville was killed in the brief engagement, and with the French in pursuit, Washington beat a hasty retreat. Disregarding the Mingo advice to keep going until he reached Virginia, Washington stopped and built Fort Necessity. After an argument, the Mingo decided Washington was a fool and left him. The French quickly surrounded the tiny fort and forced its surrender, but Washington was released after unknowingly signing a confession of murdering a French ambassador on a mission of peace. The incident started the French and Indian War (1755-63).

That same month, a conference was held at Albany between representatives of the British colonies and Iroquois League to prepare for a war with the French. Needing British help to defend Ohio from the French, the Iroquois had ceded it to Pennsylvania with the exception of the Wyoming and Susquehanna Valleys which they were determined to keep for the tribes of the Covenant Chain. Unfortunately, an Albany trader managed to get some minor Iroquois representatives drunk, and when they sobered up, they discovered they had signed an agreement with Connecticut (which by its charter also claimed northern Pennsylvania) land companies opening the Susquehanna and Wyoming Valleys to settlement. Rather than achieving unity for war against the French, the conference ended with the Iroquois furious at the British for the fraudulent treaty, Pennsylvania protesting Connecticut's attempt to claim its territory, and the Delaware still living on the upper Susquehanna threatening to kill any white who tried to settle in the Wyoming Valley.

Despite their long history as a French ally, the Caughnawaga attended the Albany Conference as part of the Iroquois delegation and agreed, on behalf of the Abenaki and Sokoki to remain neutral in the coming war. Unfortunately, they were unable to keep this promise for either themselves or their allies. The French had also been busy organizing their allies and the result was an alliance known as the Seven Nations of Canada (Seven Fires of Caughnawaga) composed of the Iroquois mission villages on the St. Lawrence (Caughnawaga, Kanasatake, Oswegatchie, and St. Regis); the Abenaki at St. Francois and Bécancour; and the Huron at Lorette. Although the Caughnawaga clearly dominated this coalition, they were over-ruled by

the pro-French majority after the outbreak of war. The Caughnawaga were not as active as in previous conflicts, but the Christian Onondaga from Oswegatchie attacked German Flats (Herkimer, New York) in 1758.



When news of the Iroquois cession of Ohio at the Albany Conference reached the Ohio tribes that fall, they decided the British were also enemies and the Iroquois could no longer be trusted. Only a few Mingo remained loyal to British. Despite the fact many Caughnawaga had moved in with the Mingo during the early 1750s, there was no sudden switch of allegiance to

the French. The Mingo remained hostile to the French who had difficulty in 1755 supplying their forts or finding allies in the area willing to defend them from the British army being assembled under General Edward Braddock. The policy of the Mingo, Shawnee, and Delaware in Ohio was one of belligerent neutrality towards both sides. As Braddock's 2,200-man army began its march towards Fort Duquesne, the French were forced to bring in 600 native allies from Canada and the Great Lakes. This, however, proved more than adequate. Braddock disdained using savages as scouts, and in July just south of Fort Duquesne (present-day Pittsburgh), he blundered into an ambush in which almost half his command was killed, including himself.

News of the defeat was met with stunned disbelief in the British colonies followed by anger. The Shawnee and Delaware picked an incredibly bad time to send a delegation to Philadelphia to protest the Iroquois sale of Ohio. Pennsylvania seized and hanged them, and the Shawnee and Delaware retaliated with raids on frontier settlements in Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia. The Delaware still under Iroquois control on the upper Susquehanna did not participate at first but, by December, 1755 had joined the war in defiance of the Iroquois council. The Susquehanna Delaware made peace in August, 1756, but the Delaware, Shawnee and Munsee continued fighting and by the end of the year more than 2,500 colonists had been killed. Another peace conference was held with the eastern Delaware at Easton, Pennsylvania in October, 1758. The Treaty of Easton paid for Delaware lands taken by New Jersey, and Pennsylvania unilaterally renounced all claim to land west of the Appalachians that had been ceded by the Iroquois at the Albany in 1754. The news soon reached Ohio, and when General John Forbes captured Fort Duquesne in November, the Delaware and Shawnee offered no resistance.

In the hysteria following Braddock's defeat in 1755, a Seneca war party enroute to attack Catawba in the Carolina had been treacherously killed by Virginia militia. Coupled with anger over the fraudulent land cessions exacted at the Albany, many of the Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga joined the French, and for the first time in almost two centuries, Iroquois found themselves on opposite sides of a war. Only the Mohawk of Hendrick (Soyengarahta) and the Oneida stayed loyal to the British. This was mainly due to William Johnson, an Irishman who had immigrated to New York in 1734 and established himself as a planter and fur trader in the Mohawk Valley. After taking a Mohawk wife (Molly Brant), Johnson became known to the Iroquois for honesty. He not only learned their language but mastered the ritual courtesies of their councils. The Mohawk called him Waraghiyaghey, meaning "Big Business."

The Mohawk were no less angry by the drunken cession of the Wyoming Valley than other Iroquois, but because they trusted Johnson, they answered his call in 1755 to help New York and New England militia take the French fort at Crown Point on Lake Champlain. Leading 200 of his Mohawk warriors, Hendrick was killed in this battle. The Caughnawaga were also there with the French, but when they saw Mohawk fighting for the English, they suddenly retired and sat out the fight. Despite the loss of their sachem, the Mohawk did likewise leaving the French and British to fight

each other. There was be no violation of the Great Law of Peace that day. The Mohawk also accompanied Johnson in the capture of Fort Niagara in July, 1759. Quebec fell that September, and Montreal surrendered the following year. After these British victories, the war in North American was over.



British soldiers occupied the remaining French forts in the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes, but rather than leave after defeating the French, they stayed as an occupying army. Fort Duquesne was rebuilt as Fort Pitt and garrisoned with 200 men. William Johnson was appointed the British Indian agent in the north and wanted to continue the French system of dealing with Native Americans through trade and annual presents. Unfortunately, the British commander in North America, Lord Jeffrey Amherst, despised Indians - friend or foe. Ignoring Johnson, Amherst ended annual gifts to treaty chiefs in 1760, increased prices on trade goods, and restricted the supply - especially firearms, powder and rum. By 1761 the Seneca were passing a war belt calling for an uprising against the British, but only the Delaware and Shawnee responded. Johnson discovered the plot from the Wyandot during a meeting at Detroit with tribes of the old French alliance. Other belts were circulated by Caughnawaga and Illinois, but it took the religious movement of Neolin, the Delaware Prophet, to provide the unity for a general revolt.

Neolin taught rejection of the white man's trade goods (especially whiskey) and a return to traditional native ways. Pontiac, chief of one the most important tribes of the old French alliance, the Ottawa at Detroit, seized on this and began to secretly organize an uprising. When it hit in 1763, the Pontiac Rebellion caught the British entirely by surprise, and six of nine forts west of the Appalachians were captured during May. However, the failure to take the other three ultimately caused the revolt to fail. The Iroquois were still healing their recent divisions and tried to remain neutral, but the Seneca joined the uprising and besieged Fort Niagara. A British column trying to reach the fort was ambushed followed by a massacre of prisoners and wounded, but Niagara held. The Mingo and Wyandot captured

Fort Venango in northwest Pennsylvania, but the siege of Fort Pitt by Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo dragged on, and the British defended it by introducing a smallpox epidemic with gifts of infected blankets and handkerchiefs to their besiegers.

While continuing the siege, the Delaware, Shawnee, and Mingo also attacked the Pennsylvania frontier killing 600 colonists. Pontiac had reserved for himself the responsibility of taking Fort Detroit but failed to achieve surprise when an informer warned the garrison. As the forts continued to hold and the British recovered from their initial surprise, the rebellion began to unravel. After a three-day battle at Bushy Run, Colonel Henry Bouquet broke the siege of Fort Pitt. Allies began to desert, and Pontiac was forced to end his siege of Detroit and retreat west to Indiana where he still had a considerable following among the Kickapoo and Illinois. While reorganizing, he asked the French at Fort de Chartres on the Mississippi for help, but the commandant refused and urged him to stop. In November Amherst was replaced by Thomas Gage who listened to William Johnson. Gage restored trade goods to previous levels and lowered prices.

Badly shaken, the British issued the Proclamation of 1763 halting all new settlement west of the Appalachian Mountains. The Seneca ended their siege of Fort Niagara and were forced to sign a humiliating surrender. Pontiac signed a peace in 1765 but was disgraced as a result. He never returned to Detroit and moved to northern Illinois in 1766. Three years later he was murdered by a Peoria (Illinois) during a visit to Cahokia. William Johnson emerged from the Pontiac Uprising in control of British Indian policy in North America. His influence was so great among the Iroquois councils that the Mohawk were literally his private army, and at his urging in 1763, they had destroyed the Delaware village of Kanhanghton as punishment for their support of Pontiac. After the war, almost all of the Delaware in the Susquehanna Valley left and moved west to Ohio.

Whites replaced them, and settlers from Connecticut finally took advantage of the drunken treaty signed by the Iroquois at Albany in 1754 and began to occupy the Wyoming Valley - conflicting claims of Connecticut and Pennsylvania resulted in pitched battles between rival frontier militias in 1768. With the whites fighting among themselves for the land, it was no place for Indians, and the remaining tribes of the Covenant Chain (Nanticoke, Saponi, Tutelo, Munsee, Delaware, and some Iroquois) left the Wyoming Valley to crowd into the rapidly shrinking Iroquois homeland in New York. With the French gone and the British controlling Canada, Caughnawaga lands were also being overrun by settlement in 1763. After their village at St. Francois had been destroyed by Rogers Rangers in 1759 during the French and Indian War, the Sokoki had found refuge with the Caughnawaga at St. Regis.

By 1763 white settlement had taken the Sokoki's lands, as well as those of the Caughnawaga, along the shores of Lake Champlain. With St. Francois already overcrowded, there was no place for these people to go. The Caughnawaga had good reason to consider joining the Pontiac rebellion in 1763 but stayed out and in the end advocated peace. They may have done better if they had fought. William Johnson supported some Caughnawaga

claims to the upper Champlain Valley but ruled the Proclamation of 1763 did not apply to lands claimed by the Sokoki in Vermont and New Hampshire. The Proclamation was doomed from the moment it was issued, and the resentment it created among the colonists was one of the main reasons for the American Revolution. Frontiersmen seeking new land simply ignored it and moved into native lands, and the British, trying to avoid a revolution, were powerless to stop the encroachment. Under pressure from the Americans to open more land for settlement, the British decided in 1768 to rescind the Proclamation and negotiate a new treaty with the Iroquois for Ohio.



Although other tribes were invited to send representatives, Johnson adhered to custom and negotiated only with the Iroquois. With the French no longer a threat, the League had lost much of its previous advantage and, with white settlement encroaching upon its own homeland, was anxious to sign an agreement to protect themselves. Johnson (himself a land speculator) had no trouble in getting them to part with their claim to Ohio in exchange for a defined boundary of their lands. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix in 1768 ceded much of western Pennsylvania and the the entire Ohio Valley. This self-serving agreement was between two parties who could no longer control the people they represented - the British for the Americans and the Iroquois for the Ohio tribes - and condemned both to a fifty-years of war which claimed more than 30,000 lives.

The Iroquois attempt to protect their homeland brought them nothing but grief. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix Treaty not only destroyed their credibility as a representative of the Ohio tribes, but many Iroquois lost faith in the

League's decisions. Shawnee protests to the Iroquois council went unanswered except for a threat of annihilation if they opposed the agreement. The Shawnee turned to others for support and, in what proved the opening move towards the western alliance, made overtures to the: Illinois, Kickapoo, Wea, Piankashaw, Miami, Potawatomi, Wyandot, Ottawa, Delaware, Mascouten, Ojibwe, Cherokee and Chickasaw. Meetings were held at the Shawnee villages on the Sciota River in Ohio in 1770 and 1771, but Johnson was able to prevent the formation of an actual alliance by threats of war with the Iroquois. Frontiersmen flooded across the mountains into the new lands. By 1774 there were 50,000 whites west of the Appalachians and more coming. The British closed many of their forts in the area and withdrew their garrisons as an "economy measure."

Most of the first settlements were along the Ohio River between Pittsburgh and Wheeling. Isolated by Johnson, the Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo in the area stood alone against the Long Knives (Virginia and Pennsylvania frontiersmen) and got along as best they could with them, but the tension was building. Problems began after treaties signed with the Cherokee opened the way for more settlement in Kentucky. Virginia sent survey teams into the area in 1773, and there were clashes with the Shawnee. Virginia militia took over abandoned Fort Pitt early in 1774 to use as a base in case of war. There was more fighting that the spring, and believing a war had already started, Michael Cresap and a group of vigilantes attacked a Shawnee trading party near Wheeling in April killing a chief.

The following month, another group of frontiersmen massacred a band of Mingo at Yellow Creek (Stuebenville, Ohio). Among the victims were the wife, brother, and sister of Logan, a Mingo war chief. The Shawnee chief Cornstalk wanted to avoid a war and visited Fort Pitt to ask the Virginians to "cover the dead," but Logan went to the Shawnee-Mingo village of Wakatomica and recruited a war party. While Cornstalk was at Fort Pitt talking peace, Logan took a gruesome revenge by killing 13 settlers near the mouth of the Muskingum River. Lord Dunmore's (Cresap's) War (1774) began in June. Logan assured colonial officials in July the killing was over, but by then whites had gathered into forts waiting for help to arrive. Spurning both Iroquois and Delaware offers to mediate, Lord Dunmore, governor of Virginia, brought a large army of militia west to the Ohio.

With the Iroquois and most of the Delaware remaining neutral, the Shawnee and their Mingo allies sent a war belt to the Detroit tribes who refused it. William Johnson kept the Miami and other possible allies at bay with threats of Iroquois intervention if they helped the Shawnee. Dunmore's militia destroyed Wakatomica and five other villages, and in October was gathering at Point Pleasant (West Virginia) on the Ohio River for a second invasion. The Shawnee and Mingo launched a sudden attack. The battle lasted most of the day with heavy casualties on both sides, but the Shawnee were finally forced to withdraw. A month later, they signed a treaty relinquishing all their claims south of the Ohio River which opened Kentucky for settlement.

The American Revolution (1775-83) began the following year with fighting at Lexington and Concord in Massachusetts just as the first Kentucky

settlements were established at Harrodstown and Boonesborough. The Quebec Act of 1774 had made the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes part of Canada and brought Virginia and Pennsylvania to the point of revolution. With the outbreak of war, the British ceased being a bystander and began urging the Shawnee and Mingo to attack the Americans. Some tribes chose neutrality, but by arguing the Americans intended to take their land, the British succeeded with the Detroit tribes, Potawatomi, and Ojibwe. They also got an alliance between the Shawnee and Cherokee (Chickamauga) war factions. In July, 1776 the Chickamauga attacked two forts in the Carolinas provoking American retaliation against all Cherokee. Meanwhile, Chickamauga and Shawnee war parties roamed through Kentucky attacking Americans.



In the midst of an impassioned speech to incite the Mohawk against the Americans in 1774, William Johnson suffered a stroke and died a few days later. His duties as the British Indian commissioner passed to his son-in-law, Guy Johnson, while his wealth and 100,000 acre estate went to his son John - both were loyalists. Neither had as much influence over the Mohawk as Sir William, but they had the help of his protégé, the Mohawk sachem Joseph Brant (Thayendanege), brother of Sir William's Mohawk wife, Molly. With the outbreak of war, both the British and Americans tried to win the support of the Iroquois. The League listened respectfully to both arguments, but although they recognized the new United States in 1776, their decision was to remain neutral. They even ordered the Shawnee to stop attacking Americans in Kentucky. Nothing stopped, but by this time the League had gotten used to its orders being ignored. If the League had been able to remain neutral, it probably would have survived the war. However, this was not to be. The "Great Peace" ended in 1777, and the Iroquois League was destroyed two years later. The Caughnawaga and the other members of the Seven Nations of Canada also intended to remain neutral in the beginning but were drawn into the war during which its members fought on both sides.

William Johnson had treated Joseph Brant like his own son and sent him to an English school on Connecticut. Rising to leadership among the Mohawk afterwards, Brant was convinced the Iroquois would lose their land if the

Americans won and strongly opposed the council's decision to remain neutral. After accepting a captain's commission in the British army, he visited England in 1775 and returned in time to participate in the Battle of Long Island in 1776. Angered by the American arrest of Sir John Johnson (William's son) for loyalist activities, Brant defied the Iroquois council and led his warriors north to stop the American attempt to capture Canada during the winter of 1776-77. Opposing Brant on the council were the Oneida and Tuscarora who, because of the missionary Samuel Kirkland, favored the Americans. The crisis came with a British effort in 1777 to cut New England off from the other colonies by seizing the Hudson Valley.

The plan called for three British armies to meet at Albany. General William Howe was to come north from New York City, while General John Burgoyne marched south from Montreal and Colonel Barry St. Leger moved east through the Mohawk Valley. St. Leger's role in the campaign which provoked a crisis on the League council since he would need their permission to move through the Iroquois homeland. Unfortunately, a recent epidemic had deprived the council of several important sachems. Still opposed by the Oneida and their sachem Skenandoah, Brant was able to win over the Seneca and Cayuga. Unable to resolve the differences between the members, the Onondaga extinguished the council fire and joined the majority going to the British. The Iroquois League had come to an end, with each tribe free to go its own way. The "Great Peace" which had prevailed among the Iroquois for centuries ended shortly afterwards at Oriskany.

Joined by Iroquois and other native allies, St. Leger moved down the Mohawk valley towards Fort Stanwix (Fort Schuyler to the Americans). On August 6th, 1777 American and British forces met at the Battle of Oriskany. Oneida warriors with the Americans and Mohawk and Seneca warriors with the British fought and killed each other. St. Leger's defeat at Oriskany and his failure to take Fort Stanwix forced him to abandon his part in the offensive and return to Canada. In October the Oneida served as scouts in the American victory over Burgoyne at Saratoga - the turning point of the Revolutionary War. They rendered further service that winter by bringing food to Washington's starving army at Valley Forge and in May, 1778 participated in the Battle of Barren Hill under the command of Lafayette. Despite the setbacks at Saratoga and Oriskany, the British and Iroquois launched a series of raids against the frontier that put the Americans on the defensive in New York and Pennsylvania during the summer and fall of 1778.

In July Brant's Mohawk attacked the Cherry Valley on the upper Susquehanna in New York. He followed this with a raid on the settlement at Minisink Island on the Delaware River between Pennsylvania and New Jersey which left several farms in flames. The real damage, however, was done during his retreat when only 30 of the 150 militia pursuing escaped an ambush. At the same time, McDonald's Tories and native warriors hit settlements in Northampton County and the Susquehanna Valley in Pennsylvania. In September Brant struck again - this time at German Flats in the Mohawk Valley. Forewarned, the Americans rushed to Forts Dayton and Herkimer where they sat helplessly inside while smoke rose from their burning homes. Two weeks later the Americans destroyed Brant's villages at

Unadilla and Oquaga on the Susquehanna. Brant joined forces with Tory Rangers commanded by Walter Butler and attacked the Cherry Valley for a second time in November. Known as the Cherry Valley Massacre, the attack took the Americans by surprise. Homes were burned, 30 settlers killed, and 71 prisoners taken. An assault on the American fort killed 16 soldiers, but the British and Mohawk withdrew the following day when reinforcements arrived.



Brant became known as "Monster Brant," but his reputation was undeserved. Most of the killing at Cherry Valley was done by Walter Butler's men who Brant later admitted were far more "savage" than any of his Mohawk. The tendency towards brutality seemed to run in the Butler family. It was Walter's father, John Butler, who orchestrated what was by far the worst massacre in the Wyoming Valley that July. Brant and his Mohawk were not present at Wyoming, and Butler's men returned to Fort Niagara with 267 scalps. This much death and destruction on the frontier could not be tolerated, and during the summer of 1779, George Washington sent three converging armies to destroy the Iroquois homeland: from the south General John Sullivan proceeded up the Susquehanna with 4,000 troops; General James Clinton moved west through the Mohawk Valley; and Colonel Daniel Brodhead pushed up the Allegheny River from Fort Pitt.

Guided by Oneida scouts, the Americans brushed aside Brant's 500 warriors and John Butler's 200 Tories at the second Battle of Oriskany and in September captured the League's capital at the Onondaga village of Kanadaseagea. Destroying everything, the Americans burned over 40 towns earning George Washington his Iroquois name of Caunotaucarius "town destroyer." The Iroquois never recovered from this disaster. Their homes and crops destroyed, the survivors spent a cold and hungry winter as refugees in the vicinity of the British fort at Niagara. Brant, however, enlisted a large war party that winter to punish the Oneida and attacked their villages. Hundreds were killed in this Iroquois civil war, and the Oneida

fled to the Americans at Schenectady. They spent the rest of the war in brutal poverty and misery but continued to serve as American scouts.



Brant was able to block an attempt by the Seneca Red Jacket to make peace with the Americans, and the Iroquois continued to attack the frontier in support of the British. Both Guy and John Johnson led raids into the Mohawk Valley during summer and fall of 1780. The Butlers were also active until Walter was killed by an Oneida warrior near Johnson Hall in October, 1781. The Americans so hated him they refused to bury his body and left it to rot. Brant fought in the Ohio Valley during 1781 and in August ambushed a group of Pennsylvania militia near the mouth of the Miami River (Cincinnati, Ohio). He also tried to ambush George Rogers Clark on the Ohio River, but Clark avoided this and reached safety at Fort Nelson (Louisville, Kentucky). Returning east, Brant's final foray into the Mohawk Valley was stopped at Johnstown during 1783, the last year of the war.

The war in the Ohio Valley was almost a separate conflict from the one east of the Appalachians and continued, despite the Treaty of Paris in 1783, with few interruptions until 1795. Shortly after the start of the war, the British began supplying arms and paying bounties for American scalps. The

Chickamauga (Cherokee) and Shawnee launched the first attacks, but indiscriminate retaliation by Americans drew the other tribes into the fighting. By the time the Iroquois entered the war in the east in 1777, the Mingo had joined the Shawnee and would remain a part of the alliance fighting the Americans until 1794. Many of the raids against Kentucky during this period originated from Pluggy's Town, a Mingo village located near present-day Delaware, Ohio. In September, 1777 Fort Henry (Wheeling) was attacked by 400 Shawnee, Mingo and Wyandot. Half of the 42-man garrison was killed, and the war party burned the nearby settlement before withdrawing. After the Americans built Fort Laurens in eastern Ohio in 1778, Mingo and Wyandot warriors surrounded it and kept it under siege until abandoned as indefensible in August, 1779. A Mingo war party also burned Hannastown, Pennsylvania in 1782. Raids and counter-raids continued until 1783 with the Mingo and other British allies moving their villages into northwest Ohio to distance them from the Americans along the Ohio River.

At the end of the war, Joseph Brant crossed into Canada with almost 2,000 followers - mostly Mohawk and Cayuga but including parts of all six members of Iroquois League as well as a few Delaware, Munsee, Saponi, Nanticoke, and Tutelo. A second group of Iroquois settled at Tyendenaga on the north shore of Lake Ontario just west of Kingston, Ontario. Brant settled along the Grand River in southern Ontario on 675,000 acres given by Governor Frederick Haldimand of Canada as compensation for the lands the Iroquois had lost in New York. Unfortunately, Haldimand's term of office ended before he could provide legal title. Brant went to England in 1785 to correct this, but the problem has persisted ever since. Totally destitute after the war, Brant ultimately had to sell 300,000 acres to feed his people (only 45,000 acres remain). From a pre-war population of 8,000, fewer than 5,000 Iroquois survived the war, 2,000 of whom had moved to Canada.

On the Six Nations Reserve at Grand River, Brant rekindled the League's council fire which had been extinguished in 1777. At the same time back in New York, a second council fire was started at Buffalo Creek leading to a question of which represented the original confederacy with its claim to the Ohio Valley. George Rogers Clark's capture of the Illinois country in 1778 had extended the boundary of the new United States to the Mississippi, and the Americans had no doubts about which one counted. They informed the Iroquois in New York that they were now a "conquered people" and forced them to sign another treaty at Fort Stanwix in 1784 ceding much of their homeland and confirming the earlier cession of Ohio made to the British in 1768. Brant's Mohawk and the Canadian Iroquois were conspicuous by their absence at the signing of this treaty, and the Iroquois League had split into two parts. The Canadian and American branches gradually grew farther apart, until by 1803 the Canadian Iroquois were no longer included in meetings of the American portion of the League.

After the Treaty of Paris, the British asked the Ohio tribes to stop their attacks on Americans. In truth, neither they nor the American frontiersmen considered the question of Ohio had been decided. As early as 1782, the British agent at Detroit, Simon De Peyster, had urged the tribes to form an alliance to keep the Americans out of Ohio. To this end, he brought Joseph

Brant went in 1783 as a representative of the Six Nations (Canadian) to attend a meeting of the Ohio tribes at Sandusky. The British did not attend themselves, but Brant's influence was important in the formation of the western alliance. Its first council fire was at the Shawnee village of Waketomica. After Waketomica was burned by the Americans in 1786, it moved to Brownstown, a Wyandot village south of Detroit.



Refusing to comply with the Paris treaty until the Americans compensated British loyalists for their losses in the war, the British continued to occupy their remaining forts on American territory. Of course, there was no way the Americans could pay these, or their other debts from the Revolution, until they sold the land in Ohio. The British were aware of the American dilemma and let it be known to the alliance tribes they would support them in any conflict with the Americans. When the Ohio tribes learned of the second Treaty of Fort Stanwix signed by the New York Iroquois in 1784, American intentions became quite clear. They also lost faith in that part of the Iroquois League's ability to represent their interests, while the influence of Brant and the Six Nations in Canada grew.

Unsure of how much authority the New York Iroquois still had in Ohio, the Americans wanted to confirm the League's cession with the resident tribes. The problem was the Americans thought of the western alliance as a British plot -which it was - and would only negotiate with individual tribes. The Fort McIntosh and Fort Finney treaties signed with the Wyandot, Delaware, Ottawa, Ojibwe, and Shawnee were useless because they did not reflect the consensus of the alliance or, in some cases, the tribes who signed. The American position was also at odds with its frontier citizens. Most of the alliance warriors wanted the Ohio River, not the Muskingum as the boundary of settlement, while the frontiersmen were not going to be satisfied until they had taken the entire Ohio Valley.


Sensing trouble, the New York Iroquois called for a meeting with the Ohio tribes at Buffalo Creek in the spring of 1786. No one came, although alliance representatives attended the League's meeting in July to ask for help against the Americans. Congress, meanwhile, sold the land rights to a New Jersey syndicate and the Ohio Company to pay war debts. Americans flooded into Ohio and took native land as squatters making treaty boundaries worthless. 12,000 whites were north of the Ohio in 1785, and short of civil war, the government could not stop them. In response to this encroachment, Shawnee and Mingo raids resumed against Kentucky. After an inspirational speech by Brant at the meeting of western alliance in November, 1786, a consensus formed demanding the Ohio as a boundary. However, the alliance council also agreed to a truce until the spring to allow its demands to reach the American Congress. For some reason, the message did not make it to Philadelphia until July, and by that time, the fighting had resumed.

A final attempt to resolve the dispute by treaty was made in December, 1787 when the American governor of the Northwest Territory, Arthur St. Clair, called for a meeting at Fort Harmar. The tribes of the western alliance were divided on how to respond. In the meeting of the council, Brant demanded the repudiation of all treaties ceding any part of Ohio, but the Wyandot wanted to negotiate and gained support from the Delaware, Detroit Ottawa, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi. Brant left the meeting in disgust and went back to Ontario deferring his role to the Shawnee and Miami. The conference finally took place in January, 1789, and the Treaty of Fort Harmar set the Muskingum River as the boundary of the frontier. This satisfied no one, and the raids continued. After the Americans retaliated against the Kickapoo, Wea, and Piankashaw villages on the lower Wabash during the summer of 1789, the Miami and Shawnee war factions dominated the alliance.

At this point the Americans decided to settle the dispute by force. The alliance again asked the New York Iroquois for help. When this was refused, the League lost whatever influence it still had with the Ohio tribes. Little Turtle's War (1790-94) began with two horrendous American defeats: Harmar (October, 1790); and St. Clair (November, 1791). The Americans could not quit, because they could not afford to lose. President Washington sent "Mad Anthony" Wayne to take command in Ohio. Wayne began training his Legion, a large force of trained regulars to back the undisciplined militia which had contributed to the earlier defeats. At the same time, the Americans were making peace overtures to the alliance in 1792 through the Iroquois. Flush with their recent victories, the alliance was in no mood to listen. At the conference, they threw the American proposal in the fire and called the Iroquois representatives "coward red men." The role of the Iroquois League in the Ohio Valley had definitely ended, and they were fortunate to leave the meeting with their lives.

However, Brant and the Six Nations from Canada continued to have influence within the alliance, but after watching Wayne's careful preparations to destroy them, the Ohio tribes began to have doubts whether they could win. After Wayne began his advance into northern Ohio in the fall of 1793, the alliance council asked Brant to negotiate a peace

with the Americans. The British had reached the same conclusion and were ready to resolve their differences with the United States. Unfortunately, this was done in secret, and as far as Brant knew, the British would still support the alliance if it chose to fight. He urged war, and the majority of the alliance reluctantly agreed. In August, 1794 Wayne's Legion and the alliance faced each other at Fallen Timbers. Driven from the field, the retreating warriors were refused refuge at the nearby British fort. In November the Jay Treaty was signed between Great Britain and the United States, and the British withdrew their garrisons from American territory. Abandoned, the alliance signed the Fort Greenville Treaty the following August ceding most of Ohio.



The ownership of Ohio was finally decided after 40-years of war. The 1784 Fort Stanwix Treaty which surrendered Ohio for a second time did not protect the Iroquois homeland. Over the next 60 years, it was surrendered to a "feeding frenzy" of land speculators whose names included most of the rich and politically powerful founding families of New York. Among the first victims were the Oneida who had served the Americans so faithfully during the Revolution and suffered as a result. Washington had promised the Oneida they would be "forever remembered" for their contributions and sacrifices and assured them their sovereignty and land rights would be respected. Nice words, but the Oneida were living in poverty after the war, and the United States did not compensate them for their losses until 1795. Meanwhile, the Oneida by 1785 had taken in the Christian Stockbridge and Brotherton Indians from New England. Desperate for money to feed themselves, the Oneida signed a treaty with New York governor George Clinton ceding most of their original 6 million acres in exchange for a smaller reservation.

For similar reasons, New York was able to make similar agreements with the Onondaga in 1788, and Cayuga the year following, buying their land and confining them to reservations. The rate at which Iroquois land was disappearing into the hands of land speculators was one reason Congress passed the Non-Intercourse Act in 1790 forbidding the sale of native lands to anyone but the federal government. To stabilize the situation, the United States signed the Canandaigua (Pickering) Treaty in 1794 to establish definite boundaries for Iroquois. The earlier New York treaties were acknowledged, but this failed to stop the land loss. There was enough New York political power that federal law and treaties were either ignored or permission to disregard them was routine. Three years after Canandaigua, the Seneca surrendered a large tract at Big Tree. More was sold in 1802 and 1823. By 1807 the Cayuga had sold the last of their New York lands. Many went west to Ohio to live with the Mingo, now known as the Seneca of the Sandusky. The others scattered to the Iroquois in New York or crossed the border into Canada.

Only two Mohawk signed the Fort Stanwix Treaty in 1784. The others were with Joseph Brant in Canada. Still at war with the Americans, at least in the Ohio, the Mohawk homeland was overrun by settlement after 1783. It seemed obvious the Mohawk were never going to get back their lands in New York. Already forced to sell part of the Grand River Reserve in Ontario to feed his people, Brant finally agreed to cede the Mohawk lands in New York in a treaty signed at Albany in 1797. The Onondaga sold much of their reservation to New York in 1822. About the same time, the Oneida had disagreements over Quaker missions versus traditional religion. In 1822 they sold their land and half agreed to relocate to Wisconsin. The Christian Stockbridge and Brotherton went with them. Problems with the government purchase of land from the Menominee delayed the move, but by 1838 more than 600 Oneida were living near Green Bay. The Tuscarora also agreed to removal, but most chose to stay in New York or move to Canada.

The final blow came with the Indian Removal Act of 1830. Pressure built to remove the remaining Iroquois from New York. The result was the Treaty of Buffalo Creek (Treaty with the New York Indians) signed in 1838 where the


Iroquois agreed to move to southeastern Kansas. In truth, much of this agreement never went into effect. Influential Quakers blocked its implementation, and by 1846 only 210 New York Seneca had moved to Kansas. In 1873 the Iroquois lands in Kansas were declared forfeited and the rights of 32 Iroquois living there were repurchased by the government. Seneca and Onondaga who fought the Americans in the Revolution stayed in New York, but the Oneida had a more difficult time. After the treaty, 250 New York Oneida purchased land near London, Ontario in 1839. By 1845 their numbers had grown to more than 400. The other 200 remained near Oneida, New York or moved in with the Onondaga. Despite federal laws, the Seneca continued to lose land to whites due to incompetence and corruption of tribal leadership. Reaction to this ended their traditional system of hereditary chiefs, and they separated from the rest of Iroquois League in 1848.

The Mingo in Ohio fought as part of the western alliance until after Fallen Timbers, and in 1795 they had made peace with the Americans at Fort Greenville. In 1805 the Wyandot signed the Treaty of Fort Industry ceding the eastern part of northern Ohio which forced the remaining Mingo villages there to relocate to northwest Ohio. The Mingo were joined in 1807 by a large group of Cayuga from New York. The continuing loss of native lands in the Ohio Valley to Americans gave rise to the movement of Tecumseh and his brother, Tenskwatawa, the Prophet. Some Mingo joined this and fought for the British during the War of 1812 (1812-15). Most Mingo, as well as the Iroquois League in New York, remained neutral. Late in the war, the Seneca declared war on the British after they had occupied Grand Island in the Niagara River which was claimed by the Seneca. As a result a British attack burned the Tuscarora settlement near Niagara Falls, New York.

After the war the Mingo who followed Tecumseh into Canada signed the Treaty of Indian Springs (1815) allowing them to return to the United States. Two years later, the Ohio tribes surrendered their last Ohio lands at Treaty of Fort Meigs (Maumee Rapids) in exchange for reservations. There were two groups of Mingo at the time - the mixed Shawnee-Seneca band received a reserve at Lewistown, Ohio, while the Seneca of the Sandusky took a 30,000 acre reserve on the Sandusky River north of Wyandot. Treaties signed at St. Marys the following year actually added to these holdings. The 100-year Mingo residence in Ohio came to an end in 1830 with the passage of the Indian Removal Act. In February 1831 the Seneca of the Sandusky signed a treaty agreeing to removal to the northeast part of the Indian Territory adjacent to the Western Cherokee.

In July Shawnee-Seneca band at Lewistown also agreed to move to the same area. In 1857 they allowed 200 Kansas Wyandot to settle at the Neosho Agency. Unfortunately, these Wyandot were pro-Union, and in June, 1862 Confederate soldiers invaded the Seneca Reserve forcing the Wyandot, as well as many of the Seneca, to leave. The Seneca spent the Civil War in refugee camps on the Marais des Cygnes River in eastern Kansas. Giving in after the war to demands by Kansas for the removal of all Indians from inside its borders, the government in 1867 negotiated a treaty with the eastern tribes which had been removed to Kansas during the 1830s. Most moved to Oklahoma, including the 200 Seneca who had arrived

from New York in 1846. The treaty separated the mixed Shawnee-Seneca band, and the different groups Seneca of Sandusky merged to form the modern Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Oklahoma.



The Caughnawaga signed only one treaty with the United States. This was at New York City in 1796 on behalf of the Seven Nations of Canada relinquishing their claims to land in New York with the exception of 36 square miles on the New York-Quebec border which was preserved as the St. Regis Reservation. St. Regis was also excluded from the removal provisions of the 1838 treaty and exists today as the the only Mohawk reservation in the United States. The Caughnawaga and other Canadian

Iroquois were active during the 1800s as trappers in the western fur trade with both the Hudson Bay and Northwest companies. Mohawk from near Montreal were regularly employed as voyageurs and laborers for the long canoe routes from Montreal to the Mackenzie Delta and Pacific Coast. The fierce competition between these two companies ended when they merged in 1821.

Besides trapping, the Iroquois had frequent contact with western tribes and frequently intermarried with them. In 1840 a Caughnawaga Iroquois, Ignace Lamoose, was responsible for Jesuit missionaries being sent to the Flathead and Kalispel in Montana. Several Iroquois employees of the Hudson Bay Company settled in the Willamette Valley of Oregon during the 1840s. Beginning about 1800, the Northwest Company convinced Iroquois families from the St. Lawrence River to move west and settle in Alberta. The Canadian government established a reserve for the Iroquois band of Chief Michel Calihoo near Villeneuve in 1877. Parts were sold to whites in 1903 and 1906. After the band surrendered its aboriginal status in 1952, the reserve was broken up into individually owned plots.

The ten-year period between Fort Stanwix and Canandaigua (1784-1795) was probably the lowest point for the Iroquois people. From there, however, they began a slow recovery which has continued to the present. In 1799 the Seneca Handsome Lake (Ganiodayo) had a spiritual vision which not only changed his life but the Iroquois history. Afterwards, he preached the "Kaiwicyoch" (Good Message) and founded the Longhouse religion - a blend of the traditional Iroquois values and Christianity. The religious values he espoused were so universal and commendable that Handsome Lake even received a letter of appreciation from President Thomas Jefferson. Because there was also an element of accommodation in his message, many Americans interpreted the Longhouse religion as the Iroquois coming around to their way of thinking. However, this was definitely not the case, since Handsome Lake strongly opposed Christian missionaries among his people. The Longhouse Religion carries a strong message of tolerance, but it is first and foremost a traditional native religion.

As such it has been responsible for the Iroquois being able to retain much of their culture and tradition despite adversity and defeat. There is still division as to whether the council fire belongs with the Six Nations in Canada or the Onondaga in New York (New York finally returned the wampum belts of the Confederacy to the Onondaga in 1989). Many Iroquois, however, still consider themselves a distinct nation from either Canada or the United States. Canada imposed an election system on the Six Nations in 1924, but many Iroquois tribes have retained their traditional system of hereditary leadership. The Iroquois opposed American citizenship when it was finally extended by the Congress in 1924 to all Native Americans in the United States. They also fought the Wheeler-Howard Indian Reorganization Act (1934) which would have required federal approval of their tribal governments.

